



# TAKTISK KRIGSSPIL FRA DEN AMERIKANSKE BORGERKRIG 1861 - 1863



2. UDGAVE MED KILDEHENVISNINGER  
1992

Krigsspil fra den amerikanske borgerkrig (15-03-92)

Dette regelsæt kan uden tilladelse kopieres til privat brug og distribueres på ikke-kommercielle vilkår, herunder placeres på web sider, hvorfra reglerne kan hentes uden særskilt betaling.

## FORORD

Dette sæt regler for krigsspil fra den amerikanske borgerkrig har været under udvikling siden 1985, hvor arbejdet med reglerne tog udgangspunkt i et enkelt sæt skemaer. Baggrunden for disse skemaer var blandt andet indtryk fra en rejse, som medlemmer af Chakoten foretog i 1973 for at besøge krigsspilsforeninger i England.

Teksten er bevidst holdt meget kort, således at den kun udgør den mest nødvendige forklaring til skemaerne. Reglerne adskiller sig på væsentlige punkter fra de tidligere regler for krigsspil fra den amerikanske borgerkrig, som blev udgivet af Chakoten i begyndelsen af 1970'erne.

Til krigsspillet anvendes bemalede tinfigurer, som opstilles i periodens formationer på et modelterræn. Spillet foregår i samtidige træk, der udføres efter ordrer, som spillerne skriver ned mellem trækkene.

I hvert træk kan alle enheder bevæges et antal centimeter og foretage skydninger eller angreb. Den usikkerhed, der er ved alle skydninger og angreb, repræsenteres af et terningkast. Den taktiske situation vurderes, således at der i skemaerne gives tillæg og fradrag til terningkastet.

Reglerne er begrænset til at dække den første del af borgerkrigen, hvor man særligt oplevede brydningen mellem de taktiske doktriner fra Napoleonstiden og de nye muligheder, som den tekniske udvikling af våbnene indebar.

Formålet med reglerne er at sætte spilleren i den situation, som en general på perioden befandt sig i. Det skal således kun være muligt at foretage de handlinger med enhederne, som kunne foretages på perioden.

Reglerne er udarbejdet af Peter Gjørtler, Søren Juul og Ole Thureholm, og de foreligger nu i 2. reviderede udgave. De fleste bestemmelser i reglerne bygger på diskussioner mellem spillerne under de enkelte krigsspil. Vi håber, at denne diskussion og dermed udviklingen af reglerne fortsætter.

Denne særlige udgave er forsynet med citater og henvisninger til kilder, der underbygger de valgte løsninger i regelsættet.

Billederne er fra det amerikanske nationalarkiv.

København, 15. marts 1992.

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## **01.00.0 MÅLESTOK OG GRUNDLAG**

### **01.01.0 Målestok**

- 01.01.1 Dette regelsæt er beregnet på anvendelse af 15 mm eller 20 mm figurer.
- 01.01.2 Et træk svarer til 5 minutter. En figur svarer til 20 mand. En pjece, et prods eller en vogn svarer til 3 eller 4 sådanne, afhængig af brikkens størrelse.
- 01.01.3 80 cm svarer til 1000 meter. En eller flere bygninger repræsenterer en mindre by. En bakkeafsats svarer til 10 meters højdeforskel.

### **01.02.0 Organisation**

- 01.02.1 Hvis intet andet fremgår af grundlaget, organiseres de taktiske enheder i de følgende standardstørrelser.
- 01.02.2 Infanteri har 3 figurer i et kompagni, 24 figurer i en bataljon og 30 figurer i et regiment.
- 01.02.3 Nordstaternes kavaleri har 3 figurer i et kompagni, 5 figurer i en eskadron, 10 figurer i en bataljon og 30 figurer i et regiment.
- 01.02.4 Sydstaternes kavaleri har 3 figurer i et kompagni, 6 figurer i en eskadron, 18 figurer i en bataljon og 30 figurer i et regiment.
- 01.02.5 Et batteri med 4 pjecer i virkeligheden har 1 pjece, 1 prods og 4 artillerister, samt 4 prodsheste. Et ridende batteri har dog 6 heste.
- 01.02.6 Et batteri med 6 pjecer i virkeligheden har 2 pjecer, 2 prods og 6 artillerister, samt 6 prodsheste. Et ridende batteri har dog 8 heste.
- 01.02.7 En trænvogn har 4 heste.
- 01.02.8 En brigadestab eller artilleribataljonsstab består af 1 general og 1 ordonnans.
- 01.02.9 En korpsstab eller divisionsstab består af 1 general og for hver direkte underlagt division eller brigade 1 ordonnans.

### **01.03.0 Brikker**

- 01.03.1 En infanterifigur anbringes på en brik med 8 mm front og 15 mm dybde. Inden for et regiment brikkes figurerne 3 og 3 ved siden af hinanden, idet mindst 6 figurer anbringes på enkeltbrikker. Skarpskytter brikkes dog 2 og 2 med mindst 10 figurer på enkeltbrikker.
- 01.03.2 En rytter (kavalerist, general, ordonnans) anbringes på en brik med 15 mm front og 30 mm dybde. Inden for en eskadron brikkes figurerne 2 og 2 med mindst 2 enkeltfigurer.

- 01.03.3 Et batteri med 4 pjecer i virkeligheden anbringes på en brik med 40 mm front. Pjecebrikkens dybde er 45 mm, og prodsbrikkens dybde er 85 mm.
- 01.03.4 Et batteri med 6 pjecer i virkeligheden anbringes på brikker med 30 mm front. Pjecebrikkernes dybde er 45 mm, og den ene prodsbriks dybde er 70 mm, mens den andens er 45 mm.
- 01.03.5 Et par ekstra prodsheste forøger prodsbrikkens længde med 30 mm.
- 01.03.6 En trænvogn anbringes på en brik med 40 mm front og 110 mm dybde.

#### **01.04.0 Terninger**

- 01.04.1 Ved terningkast anvendes 2 almindelige sekssidede terninger.

#### **01.05.0 Grundlaget**

- 01.05.1 Spillet's tilrettelægger angiver i et grundlag oplysninger om periode, terræn, klima, deltagende styrker og øvrige særlige forhold. Desuden meddeles det strategiske og operative oplæg, forsyningsituation, moral, osv.

"Beauregard welcomed these troops and described to Johnston what had happened. The enemy, Beauregard said, in all probability was at Centreville, two miles and a half North of Bull Run. To cope with the Federals, Beauregard proposed to use Johnston's troops in an elaborate concentration. The new senior commander had never been in Bull Run previously, and had he attempted to reconnoitre the ground after his arrival he would have found it too extensive to be covered in an afternoon and, perhaps, too complicated to be mastered quickly. The only map that was shown him did not represent any of the elevations. It merely displayed the roads, villages and streams." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants - a Study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1942, Vol 1, p. 46).

"President Davis subsequently stated that, at this point in the discussion, he asked Johnston to what line the retreat would be conducted, when it became practicable. The General, said Davis, 'declared himself ignorant of the topography of the country in his rear.' Davis commented: "This confession was a great shock to my confidence in him. That a General should have selected a line which he himself considered untenable, and should not have ascertained the topography of the country in his rear was inexplicable on any other theory than that he had neglected the primary duty of a commander." Of this Davis said nothing at the time." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants a Study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1942, Vol 1, p. 135).

"The wise serpent made a successful retreat. The rear of a retreating army is always its best guarded point." (Longstreet, James: The Battle of Fredericksburg, in Battles & Leaders, vol. 3, p. 84).

"The operation of this railway during the first days of March, 1862 was an early, classic example of the manner in which a single-tracked line that lacked adequate sidings could be overcrowded with trains. A brief but illuminating report by Quartermaster General Myers, dated March 7, 1862, will be found in O. R., 5, 1093. Myers thought too many trains had been put on a railroad of limited turn-outs." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants a Study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1942, Vol 1, p. 139).

"Absolute concealment is generally impracticable in a camp. Maps must be drawn, and reports furnished. Reconnoitring parties must be sent out, roads examined, positions surveyed, and shelter and supplies requisitioned in advance. Thus the movements of staff officers are a clue to the projected movements of the army, and the smallest hint may set a hundred brains to the work of surmise." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co.,

London 1900, vol. 1, p. 183).

"From Romney an excellent road runs south-east to Winchester, and another south-west by Moorefield and Franklin to Monterey, where it intersects the great road, constructed by one of Napoleon's engineers, that leads from Staunton in the Valley to Parkersburg on the Ohio." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 186).

"The provision train lagged far in rear. Axes there were none; and had not the fence-rails afforded a supply of firewood, the sufferings of the troops would have been intense. As it was, despite the example of their commander, they pushed on but slowly though the bitter weather [in January 1862]." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 192).

"I have taken special pains, he [Jackson in 1862] writes on January 17, to obtain information respecting General Banks, but I have not been informed of his going east. I will see what can be effected through the Catholic priests at Martinsburg. .... He had agents everywhere. His intelligence was more ample than that supplied by the Confederate agents in Washington itself. No reinforcements could reach the Potomac without his knowledge. He was always accurately informed of the strength and the movements of their detachments. Nor had he failed to make the precautions which minimise the evils arising from dissemination. He constructed a line of telegraph from Charlestown, within seven miles of Harper's ferry, to Winchester. He had established relays of couriers through his district. By this means he could communicate with Hill at Leesburg in three hours, and by another line of posts with Johnston at Centreville." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 202).

"Of the existence of the bridge at Port Republic, held by a party of Confederate cavalry, the Federals do not appear to have been aware." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 360, on Port Royal 1862).

01.05.2 Der oplyses om kommandovej og brigadesammensætning for de deltagende styrker, samt om figurantal, valeur og bevæbning i hver enhed.

"The limited supply of rifles in the State arsenals [in Virginia, at the outbreak of war] were soon exhausted. Flintlock muskets, converted to percussion action, were then supplied; but no inconsiderable numbers of fowling pieces and shot-guns were to be seen amongst the infantry, while the cavalry, in default of sabres, carried rude lances fabricated by country blacksmiths." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 105).

"After the President visited the Army at the end of September, he directed General Johnston to brigade together troops from the same State, in the belief that this would create wholesome rivalry." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants a Study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1942, Vol 1, p. 118).

"The organisation of the armies were very largely the work of civilian authorities, and the advice of soldiers was very generally disregarded. The Northern wiseacres considered cavalry an encumbrance and staff a mere ornamental appendage. McClellan, in consequence, was always in difficulties for the want of mounted regiments; and while many regular officers were retained in the command of batteries and companies, the important duties of the staff had sometimes to be assigned to volunteers. The men too, at first, were asked to serve for three months only; that is, they were permitted to take their discharge directly they had learnt the rudiments of their work. Again, instead of ranks of the old regiments being filled up as casualties occurred, the armies, despite McClellan's protests, were recruited by raw regiments, commanded by untrained officers." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 215).

"The Ohio and West Virginia Regiments, of which the Federal force was composed, fought with the vigour which always characterised the Western troops. Jackson fully recognised the fine fighting



qualities of his compatriots. As Shield's brigade (division), he wrote on April 5, is composed principally of Western troops, who are familiar with the use of arms, we must calculate on hard fighting to oust Banks if attacked only in front, and may meet with obstinate resistance, however the attack may be made." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 298 on the Battle of McDowell, 1962).


"The 8th [writes Taylor of the Louisiana Brigade] were from the Attakapas Acadians, the race of whom Longfellow sings in 'Evangeline' a home-loving, simple people; few spoke English, even fewer still had ever moved ten miles from their native cabanas; and the war to them was a liberal education." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 311).

01.05.3 I grundlaget kan der være angivet særregler og ændringer i de almindelige regler, som kun har virkning i det pågældende spil.

### 01.06.0 Spillerne og dommeren

01.06.1 Dommerens beslutninger er inappellable og indiskutable, hvad enten det drejer sig om suppleringer til eller undtagelser fra reglerne. Sådanne beslutninger er kun bindende for det igangværende spil. Øvrige ændringer af mere permanent karakter kan kun vedtages af en regelændringskomite uden for spillet.

01.06.2 Efterledes dommerens beslutning ikke, kan dommeren give pågældende spiller en reprimande og i særligt graverende tilfælde eller i gentagelsestilfælde idømme disciplinarmidler, f.eks. standsning af spillerens enheder i et træk eller mere eller særlige valeur-reduktioner og lignende.



## 02.00.0 FORMATIONER OG MARCHLÆNGDER

### 02.01.0 Infanteriets formationer

02.01.1 Marchkolonne: 3 figurer i front.

02.01.2 Angrebskolonne: 6 figurer i front og mindst 3 geledder.

"The use of columns instead of lines was more attractive in broken terrain, since they gave greater manoeuvrability, but the problem of excessive bunching remained. .... Some large assaults in columns or a succession of lines met with success enough to keep the idea alive throughout the war but more often they met with failure." (Griffith, Paddy: Rally Once Again Battle Tactics of the American Civil War, The Crowood Press, Wiltshire 1987, p. 152).

"The enemy in the meanwhile formed a strong column of lines of attack, and advancing under cover of their own artillery, and no longer impeded by ours, came forward along our whole front in the most determined manner; but by this time, as just explained, I had lines four deep throughout the whole sunken road, and beyond the right flank. The front rank, firing, stepped back, and the next in rear took its place and, after firing, was replaced by the next, and so on in rotation. In this way the volley firing made nearly continuous, and the file firing very destructive. The enemy was repulsed at all points." (McLaws, Lafayette: The Confederate Left at Fredericksburg, in Battles & Leaders, vol. 3, p. 94).

02.01.3 Linie: Figureerne anbragt på 2 geledder.

02.01.4 Tynd linie: Figureerne anbragt på 1 geled med mindre end brikafstand som mellemrum.

02.01.5 Kæde: Figureerne anbragt på 1 geled med brikafstand eller op til dobbelt brikafstand som mellemrum (jf. 04.02.11).

### 02.02.0 Kavaleriets formationer

02.02.1 Marchkolonne: 2 figurer i front.

02.02.2 Angrebskolonne: 5-6 figurer i front og mindst 3 geledder.

"Now the Third Virginia, with drawn sabers, was yelling furiously, and, in columns of fours, was charging straight for the stone fence. .... The van had reached the stone wall, and was galloping in front of it toward the Confederate left. The men had drawn their pistols and were firing at the blue line behind the fence, but they had not been able to get over the barrier." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants a Study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1944, vol. 2, p. 462 on Kelly's Ford).

02.02.3 Linie: Figureerne anbragt på 2 geledder.

02.02.4 Kæde: Figureerne anbragt på 1 geled med op til brikafstand som mellemrum (jf. 04.02.11).

02.02.5 Beredent infanteri regnes i enhver henseende som kavaleri. Afsiddet kavaleri regnes normalt som infanteri (se dog 05.01.5 og 07.04.3).

"With his chief's approval, Fitz Lee sent word to the Third Virginia to push forward one squadron, dismounted as sharpshooters. After these men had taken position and peppered the enemy, the whole regiment would be ordered to charge." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants a study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1944, vol. 2, p. 462 on Kelly's Ford).

**02.03.0 Artilleriets formationer**

- 02.03.1 Marchkolonne: Prods og pjece bag hinanden, og kun en brik i front.
- 02.03.2 Linie: Pjece alene eller 2 pjecer ved siden af hinanden.
- 02.03.3 Ved afprodsning fjernes prodset fra bordet, og pjecebrikken anbringes, hvor prodset stod.

"The ammunition chests had been taken off the limbers and placed upon the ground behind the traverses close to the guns. The horses and limbers had been sent to the rear out of danger." (Owen, William Miller: A hot day on Marye's Heights, in Battles & Leaders, vol. 3, p. 97).

- 02.03.4 Ved påprodsning anbringes prodset bag pjecebrikken. Enheder, der står i vejen, må flyttes, før prodsning er mulig (se dog 02.05.3).

**02.04.0 Sluttede og spredte formationer, samt enheder i bygninger**

- 02.04.1 Marchkolonne, angrebskolonne og linie udgør sluttede formationer.
- 02.04.2 Kæde og tynd linie samt enheder i FU udgør spredte formationer.
- 02.04.3 Enheder i bygninger regnes ved skydning som i tynd linie, og ved chokkast som i linie uden flanker eller ryg. Der kan være op til 3 kompagnier i hver bygning. Ved skydning kan der kun anvendes 1 skydeenhed fra en husside, mens alle figurerne medregnes ved chokkast.

**02.05.0 Formationsændringer og vendinger**

- 02.05.1 Formationsændringer foretages omkring et kompagni, der står stille. Øvrige kompagnier marcherer til deres nye pladser.
- 02.05.2 Formationsændringer tager mindst 1/4 træk. Af- og opsidning, af- og påprodsning samt vendinger tager den tid, der fremgår af skema II.

"Presently the true condition of affairs appeared when the victorious brigades of Franklin emerged from the woods. Line and field officers rushed to and fro, wildly shouting, "Into line, into line!" and, even in the face of a flanking foe, the gallant Colonel Turney, who temporarily commanded Anchor's brigade, succeeded in re-forming his regiments at right angles to the former line of attack. This gave a brief check to the victors." (Moore, J.H.: With Jackson at Hamilton's Crossing, in Battles & Leaders, vol. 3, p. 140).

- 02.05.3 Spredte formationer beregner ikke tid til vendinger. Umiddelbart før afprodsning og efter påprodsning kan artilleri foretage en halv vending uden særskilt beregning af tid.

"On the wooded ridge above the artillery was unable to hold its own. The enemy's riflemen swarmed in the thickets, and the batteries fell back. As they limbered up one of the six-pounders was overturned. Under a hot fire, delivered at no more than fifty paces distant, the sergeant in charge cut loose the three remaining horses, but the gun was abandoned to the enemy." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 244 on Kernstown, 1862).

- 02.05.4 Infanteri og kavaleri i linie kan opstilles i marchkolonne ved at

foretage 1/4 vending og omvendt.

02.05.5 Ændring af marchretning sker gennem pivotering. Marchlængden for et sving på 90 grader er 1 1/2 gange frontbredden.

02.05.6 I et stormtræk kan der kun ændres marchretning 1 gang, idet ændringen højst kan udgøre 20 grader, og der kan ikke foretages formationsændring.

## **02.06.0 Marchlængder, hindringer og dækninger**

02.06.1 Marchlængder for et helt træks bevægelse fremgår af skema I (se også 03.03.4 om storm og flytning i dele af trækket, samt 06.03.5 om materielstab).

"On this unhappy return from Richmond, Johnston found the roads of Northern Virginia even worse than when he left. Rain fell on the 22d the day of Davis's somber inauguration as President under the permanent constitution. So deep was the mud around Dumfries that men on good horses took six hours and a half to cover twelve miles. Four animals could not pull a light field gun along a road. Removal of the heavy ordnance from fixed positions seemed impossible." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants a Study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1942, Vol 1, p. 137).

"D.H. Hill, on the extreme left, moved swiftly forward to the edge of the swamp. In ignorance of the ground, some of his brigade commanders overlapped their lines. Whole regiments, on advancing, found other Confederate units in their front. Vainly Hill sought to correct the alignment. Robert Rodes, still weak from his wounds at Seven Pines, strove to untangle his men." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants a study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1944, vol. 1, p. 533 on Gaines' Mill).

"They had marched over twenty miles, and so great was their exhaustion that the men sank prostrate on the ground beside their muskets. .... The discouragement of that days march, says Johnston, to one accustomed to the steady gait of regular soldier is indescribable. The views of military obedience and command then [July 1861] taken both by officers and men confined their duties and obligations almost exclusively to the drill-ground and guards. In camps and marches they were scarcely known. Consequently, frequent and unreasonable delays caused so slow a rate of marching as to make me despair of joining General Beauregard in time to aid him (Johnston's Narrative)." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 134).

"The cavalry, artillery, and waggons moved by road; and the remainder of Johnston's infantry was expected to follow the First Brigade [by rail] without delay. But in war, unless there has been ample time for preparation, railways are not always an expeditious means of travel. The line [Piedmont to Manassas Junction] was single; so short notice had been given that it was impossible to collect enough rolling-stock; the officials were inexperienced [July 1861]; there was much mismanagement." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 135).

"Napoleon's fifth element, mud, is a most disturbing factor in military calculations. It is related that a Federal officer, sent out to reconnoitre a road in a certain district of Virginia, reported that the road was there, but that he guessed the bottom had fallen out." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 232 on Kernstown, 1862).

"The highways, even the Valley pike itself, the great road which is inseparably linked with the fame of Stonewall Jackson and his brigade, are mere ribbons of metal laid on swell and swale." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 238).

"The stars were still shining when the Confederates began their retreat from Kernstown. .... Had the

2,000 troopers at Banks' disposal been sent forward at daybreak on the 24th, something might have been done. The squadrons, however, incapable of moving across country, were practically useless in pursuit; and even to start at daybreak was to start too late. If the fruits of victory are to be secured, the work must be put in hand whilst the enemy is still reeling under shock. A few hours' delay gives him time to recover his equilibrium." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 262 on Kernstown).

02.06.2 Enheder, der skal bevæge sig baglæns, gør dette med halv marchhastighed, idet der ikke kan anvendes storm. Dette gælder dog ikke afprodset artilleri.

02.06.3 Gennemmarch af en enhed nedsætter ikke marchhastigheden (se dog 04.02.9). En enhed i sluttet formation kan ikke gennemmarcheres af enheder i storm (jf. 04.02.5). Såfremt en enhed i sluttet formation er i U, eller den har ordre til bevægelse eller skydning (se også 04.02.14), kan den kun gennemmarcheres af enheder i FU. Modstanderens enheder kan kun gennemmarcheres, såfremt de er i FU.

"Garnett's march on the 12th carried his van to Kaler's Ford on Cheat River, where the men bivouacked in a heavy rain. The next morning he continued his retreat over a heavy road and through a difficult country. Ford after ford lay ahead. Good soldier that Garnett was, mindful both of front and of rear, he proceeded with a squadron of cavalry, a section of artillery and a regiment in front. Next came his wagons and then his two other regiments, a couple of guns and a small cavalry rearguard. The entire force Garnett kept in close order. Ere the wagon train had crossed the first ford above Kaler's, the cavalry brought the grim news that the enemy, with infantry and artillery in support of mounted troops, was near at hand. Immediately Garnett ordered the First Georgia, which was one of his rear regiments, to form across a meadow on the riverside and to hold the enemy in check till the wagons got away. The trains secured, the Georgia regiment was to retire and was to pass through the Twenty-third Virginia, which would be in position to repel attack. This was done under fire. By successive halts and withdrawals and with few casualties, the two regiments covered the wagon train until Carrick's Ford, three miles and a half from Kaler's was reached. At that swift, deep crossing, some of the wagons stalled. Time was lost in trying vainly to extricate them. The Twenty-third Virginia then crossed and took up a defensive position. After the Georgians had passed through their line, the Virginians met the Federals with vigor and delayed them long enough for the wagons to get a good lead." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants a Study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1942, Vol 1, p. 34).

02.06.4 Opsiddet kavaleri kan ikke storme, såfremt det ikke var i bevægelse ved slutningen af sidste træk, eller såfremt det skal passere en hindring i dette træk.

02.06.5 Vandløb og sump kan kun passeres i marchkolonne eller kæde.

02.06.6 Passage af hindringer foretages for enkelte våbenarter som angivet i skema III. Hindring- og dækningsværdier fremgår af skema XXII.

"A deep ditch, cut across the road, hindered effective action, and the only position where reply to the enemy's fire was possible lay beyond this obstacle. Despite the losses of his command Jackson managed to lift one gun across by hand. But his men became demoralised. They left their posts." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 41).

"It seems evident, therefore, that it was not till near noon that Jackson's patrols came in sight of Middletown, and that the Confederate advance guard had taken at least six hours to cover seven miles. The country, however, between Cedarville and the Valley turnpike was almost a continuous forest; and wood-fighting is very slow fighting." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 329 on Middletown, 1962).

"On the afternoon of the 6th the Federal cavalry followed Ashby. Some three miles from Harrisonburg is a tract of forrest, crowning a long ridge; and within the timber the Confederate squadrons occupied a strong position. The enemy, 800 strong, pursued without precaution, charged up a gentle hill, and were repulsed by a heavy fire. Then Ashby let loose his mounted men on the broken ranks, and the Federals were driven back to within half a mile of Harrisonburg, losing 4 officers and 30 men." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 361, on Port Royal 1862).

02.06.7 Let feltbefæstning giver ikke dækning for opsiddet kavaleri og artilleri.



## 03.00.0 ORDERER

### 03.01.0 Instrukser og ordrer

03.01.1 Instrukser fra divisionsgeneraler eller højere gives skriftligt. De vil ofte være udformet kortfattet (Jeg vil gøre følgende: ....., De skal gøre: ....., Jeg befinder mig ved: .....

"The next day, July 20th Johnston and part of his troops arrived at Manassas Junction under authority received from Richmond at 1 A.M, July 18. The text of this message, O. R., 2, 478, which subsequently was a matter of some dispute (see infra, p. 103), was as follows: Richmond, July 17, 1861, General J. E. Johnston, Winchester, Va.: General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive blow a junction of all your effective force will be needed. If practicable. Make the movement, sending all your sick and baggage to Culpeper Court-House either by railroad or by Warrenton. In all the arrangements exercise your discretion. S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants - a Study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1942, Vol 1, p. 46).

"These orders seemed simple enough, but from the time they were put in execution co-ordinated effort virtually ended. Although the divisional leaders were not far apart, most of them lost track. This was due, in the first place, to the nature of the ground and to lack of information concerning it." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants - a study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1944, vol. 1, p. 590 on Malvern Hill).

"At approximately 9.30, the contrast between the situation which headquarters assumed, and the situation that existed, from Ewell's right to Jackson's left, was as follows:"

SITUATION ASSUMED AT HEAD-QUARTERS	ACTUAL SITUATION
Ewell: Moving beyond Union Mills Ford to advance on Centreville.	Ewell: Holding himself in readiness to make a diversion to relieve the pressure on the center and possibly on the left.
Holmes: Moving in support of Ewell.	Holmes: Orders as above.
D.R. Jones: Across Bull Run and supporting Ewell, in the belief that Ewell had received orders to cross.	D.R. Jones: Awaiting word of Ewell's advance.
Longstreet: Perhaps not known; more probably, across the Run and sharing in the movement of Ewell and Jones.	Longstreet: Already across and lightly engaged under orders of 4.30 A.M. which had not been cancelled.
Bonham: Across the Run and participating in the movement of the Brigades to his right.	Bonham: No orders received; under artillery fire.
Early: In position to support either Longstreet or D. R. Jones.	Early: Situation as assumed at headquarters.
Cocke: Prepared to hold to the last extremity on the defensive.	Cocke: Situation as assumed at headquarters.
Jackson: Moving to Cocke's right.	Jackson: Situation as assumed at headquarters.

In other words, the columns of attack on the right were utterly at cross purposes, Cocke was on the

defensive, Jackson was marching to the left center, and Early alone, at a new position, was in reserve. On the left, beyond the Stone Bridge, Bee and Evans were engaged in an adventure, presently to be described, that had been neither ordered nor anticipated. Hampton was soon to share it. For the moment, the army was so scattered, so variously occupied, that orderly, united action of any sort was impossible." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants - a Study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1942, Vol 1, p. 57).

"During my twenty years of service on the frontier, said one of the most famous of the Confederate leaders [General R.S. Ewell], I learned all about commanding fifty United States dragoons and forgot everything else." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 25).

"Deployment for battle had not yet [July 1861] been practiced, and to deploy 10,000 or 20,000 men for attack is a difficult operation, even with fully-drilled troops and an experienced staff." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 136).

03.01.2 Ordre til de taktiske enheder skrives forud for hvert træk på en ordreseddel, hvor enhedernes tab og moral også føres. Ordresedler skal være udfyldt inden trækets begyndelse for hver enhed, der er underlagt hver general (se også 08.05.1). Er dette ikke sket, må dommeren antage, at pågældende enhed ikke skal foretage sig noget.

"Sunday morning, the 21st of July, broke clear and warm. Through a miscarriage of orders, the Confederate movement was delayed." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 142 on First Bull Run, 1861).

03.01.3 På ordresedlen anvendes tegn og forkortelser, f.eks. pil i marcheretning, "sg" for skydning med granat osv. Retningspile ol. skal laves ud fra den forudsætning, at ordresedlen ligger på krigsspilbordet med nederste kant svarende til spillerens egen baglinie.

03.01.4 Ordre gælder for hele trækket, idet enhederne ikke kan reagere på nye forhold i løbet af trækket (se dog 04.02.0 og 07.01.2).

03.01.5 Der gives ikke taktiske ordre til generaler eller deres ordonnanser, som kun kan bevæges 1 gang i hvert træk (jf. skema I). Bevægelsen foretages uden beregning af tid, men kun på grundlag af observationer eller oplysninger som anført i 03.02.2. En general eller ordonnans, som er i brikkontakt med en enhed, kan dog flyttes sammen med denne (uanset 08.02.9), uden at dette regnes som en bevægelse.

### **03.02.0 Grundlag for ordre**

03.02.1 Ordre til de taktiske enheder skal være i overensstemmelse med brigadens pålagte instruks (jf. 03.01.1), som kun kan fraviges, når der foreligger ganske særlige omstændigheder.

"When informed of Jackson's orders, Steuart showed himself a stickler: he was under Ewell, he said; orders to him must come through the division commander." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants a study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1944, vol. 1, p. 405 on Winchester).

"Gordon's quick movement on the morning of May 4 was commended, though Early had to say that if Gordon had not been successful, he would have been forced to court-marshal the Georgian for starting before the other Brigades were prepared to move." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants a study in



Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1944, Vol 2, p. 650 on Chancellorsville).

"In addition, Anderson had dispatched Wilcox's staff officer to Mahone with an order for the Virginian to advance, but Mahone was reported to have said that he had instructions to hold his position and that he would not leave it. 'But,' the aide was alleged to have answered, 'I am just from General Anderson and he orders you to advance.' Mahone is said to have replied, 'No, I have my orders from General Anderson himself to remain here.'" (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants a study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1944, vol. 3, p. 127 on Gettysburg).

"Such was the battle of Fredericksburg as I saw it. It has been asked why we did not follow up the victory. The answer is plain. It goes without saying that the battle of the First Corps, concluded after nightfall, could not have been changed into offensive operations. Our line was about three miles long, extending through woodland over hill and dale. An attempt at concentration to throw the troops against the walls of the city at that hour of the night would have been little better than madness. The Confederate field was arranged for defensive battle." (Longstreet, James: The Battle of Fredericksburg, in Battles & Leaders, vol. 3, p. 82).

"If I had been in General Burnside's place, I would have asked the President to allow me to resign rather than execute his order to force the passage of the river and march the army against Lee in his stronghold." (Longstreet, James: The Battle of Fredericksburg, in Battles & Leaders, vol. 3, p. 85).

"Under the supposition that the orders asked for would soon be received, General Franklin gave General Reynolds and myself orders to do all the preliminary work possible; which being done, we returned to General Franklin's headquarters to await the arrival of the messenger from General Burnside. As the precious time passed by we fell to discussing the condition of affairs." (Smith, William Ferrar: Franklin's "Left Grand Division", in Battles & Leaders, vol. 3, p. 133).

"If, therefore, the immediate vicinity of Stone bridge be regarded as the terminus of the left flank, General Johnston's statement implies that all these officers except Evans took their position in obedience to orders. In actual fact, the turning movement was launched from the Sudley Farm, nearly three miles upstream. In dealing with that unanticipated advance, the commanders of the Confederate columns assuredly acted on their own initiative." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants a Study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1942, Vol 1, p. 64).

"Evans' soldierly instinct had penetrated the design of the Federal commander, and his ready assumption of responsibility threw a strong force across the path of the turning column, and gave time for his superiors to alter their dispositions and bring up the reserves." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 142 on First Bull Run, 1861).

"Johnston had intended that when the main army fell back towards Richmond his detachments should follow suit. Jackson found a loophole in his instructions which gave him full liberty of action." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 217 on Kernstown, 1862).

"Garnett, the commander of the Stonewall Brigade, without referring to the general, who was in another part of the field, had given the order to fall back. .... Many of the men, their ammunition exhausted, had fallen to the rear. The exertions of the march had begun to tell. The enemy's attacks had been fiercely pressed, and before the pressure of his fresh brigades the Confederate power of resistance was strained to the breaking-point. Garnett had behaved with conspicuous gallantry. The officers of his brigade declared that he was perfectly justified in ordering a retreat. Jackson thought otherwise, and almost immediately after the battle he had him relieved of his command, placed him under arrest, and framed charges for his trial by court-martial. .... Now, in the first place, it must be conceded that Garnett had not the slightest right to abandon his position without a direct order. He was aware, moreover, that supports were coming up, for the order to the 5th Virginia was sent through him. .... At most, then, when he gave the order to retreat, Garnett had lost 200, or rather less than 20 per cent. Such loss was heavy, but by no means excessive. A few months later hardly a brigade in either army would have given way because every fifth man had fallen." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil

War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 243 and 253 on Kernstown, 1862).

03.02.2 Ordre skal være baseret på enten brigadegeneralens egne observationer eller observationer foretaget af en underlagt enhed inden for 40 cm af brigadegeneralen.

"The Twenty fourth Virginia started off briskly across the wheat field and into the woods, but the less experienced Thirty eight, under a Lieutenant Colonel who had not been in action previously, was slow in getting under way. Soon it was fifty yards behind the regiment on its left. Early had to send back and order it to the double quick." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants a study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1944, vol. 1, p. 183 on Williamsburg).

"Col. Michah Jenkins of the Palmetto Sharpshooters, a youth of 26 years, had received command of one column when R.H. Anderson divided the brigade. .... Often his men had fought at 100 yards and sometimes at a third of that distance." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants a study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1944, Vol 1, p. 249 on Seven Pines).

"Neither Federal general could communicate with the other, for the country between them was held by the enemy. Both had been informed of the other's whereabouts, but both were uncertain as to the others movements; and the dread of encountering, unsupported, the terrible weight of Jackson's onset had sapped their resolution." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 350, after Winchester, 1862).

03.02.3 Synsvidden er 250 cm. Enheder i by og skov kan dog først ses på 8 cm, med mindre de skyder eller bevæger sig og derfor kan ses på 15 cm. Der skal selvfølgelig tages hensyn til døde vinkler, kreter mv. Kreter tillægges dog ikke betydning for synsvidden på selve den bakkeafsats, som en enhed opholder sig på.

"The cellars of the houses near the river were made available for the use of riflemen, and zigzags were constructed to enable the men to get in and out of the rifle-pits under cover. All this was done night, and so secretly and quietly that I do not believe the enemy had any conception of the minute and careful preparations that had been made to defeat any attempt to cross the river in my front. No provision was made for the use of artillery, as the enemy had an enormous array of their batteries on the heights above the town, and could have demolished ours i five minutes." (McLaws, Lafayette: The Confederate Left at Fredericksburg, in Battles & Leaders, vol. 3, p. 86).

"The smoke lay so thick that we could not see the enemy, and I think they could not see us, but we were aware of the fact that somebody in our front was doing a great deal of shooting." (Couch, Darius N.: Sumner's "Right Grand Division", in Battles & Leaders, vol. 3, p. 115).

"The men detrained near the station, about 1 P.M., threw off their knapsacks, and formed a line. .... Through dust so thick that one rank could not see the men immediately in front of them, Smith hurried his troops into battle." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants a Study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1942, Vol 1, p. 83).

"As the tactics of Wellington so often proved, a position from which the view is limited, well in rear of a crest line, may be exceedingly strong for defence, provided that troops who hold it can use the bayonet. It would be difficult in the extreme for the Federals to pave the way for their attack with artillery." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 146 on First Bull Run, 1861).

"The uniforms in the two armies at this time were much alike, and from the direction of their approach it was difficult at first for the officers in charge of the Federal batteries to make sure that the advancing troops were not their own. A moment more and the doubtful regiment proved its identity by a deadly volley, delivered at a range of seventy yards. Every gunner was shot down; the teams were almost annihilated, and several officers fell killed or wounded." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 149 on First Bull Run, 1861).

### 03.03.0 Ordregivning

- 03.03.1 En enhed kan kun gives ordre til og udføre 1 handling i trækket: enten bevægelse, stå stille eller skydning (se dog 04.02.0). Formationsændringer, vendinger, op- og afsidning, af- og påprodsning, samt feltarbejder regnes som bevægelse. Reorganisering regnes som at stå stille.
- 03.03.2 Enheder inden for 40 cm af brigadegeneralen kan gives alle typer ordrer (se dog 03.03.5 og 04.02.0). Det samme gælder enheder, der gives ordrer pr. ordonnans.

"The contest that ensued, says General Imboden, was terrific. Jackson ordered me to go from battery to battery and see that the guns were properly aimed and the fuses cut the right length. This was the work of but a few minutes." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 149 on First Bull Run, 1861).

"A failure in staff duties marred to some extent the Confederate success. A vicious usage, according to Dabney, obtained at this time in the Southern armies. This was the custom of temporarily attaching to the staff of a general commanding a division or an army a company of cavalry to do the work of orderlies. By this clumsy contrivance the organisation of the cavalry regiments was broken up, the men detached were deprived of all opportunity for drill, and the general had no evidence whatever of their special fitness for the responsible service confided to them. Nay, the colonel of cavalry was likely to select the least serviceable company. .... The panic-struck boy by whom the orders were sent was seen no more. .... This unfortunate incident taught the necessity of a picked company of orderlies, selected for their intelligence and courage, permanently attached to headquarters, and owing no subordination to any other than the general, and his staff. Such was the usage that afterwards prevailed in the Confederate armies." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 322 on Front Royal, 1862).

- 03.03.3 Øvrige enheder kan kun gives følgende ordrer: Gentagelse af ordren fra sidste træk, stå stille og skydning.
- 03.03.4 Ved bevægelse angives retning, eventuelle formationsændringer, om der angribes, og om der stormes. Ridende artilleri kan storme for at komme i stilling eller trække sig tilbage. Øvrige enheder kan kun storme ved angreb. Der kan stormes 1 gang pr. 4 træk. Hvis intet andet er angivet, flytter enheden hele trækket, også under angreb.

"A gigantic young Lieutenant, Thomas L. Rosser, had command of four howitzers of the Washington Artillery. After having been sent on a useless mission, he plunged across Union Mills Ford and rushed his men at the double-quick all the way to the scene of action--only to find the enemy gone." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants a Study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1942, Vol 1, p. 97).

"Imboden's battery, with but three rounds remaining for each piece, galloped back across the Henry Hill, and this commanding height, the key of the battle ground, was abandoned to the enemy." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 144 on First Bull Run, 1861).

- 03.03.5 Infanteri kan kun gives ordre til angreb, såfremt over halvdelen af regimentets eller bataljonens figurer skal deltage. For opsiddet kavaleri skal mindst en tredjedel af regimentets figurer deltage. Såfremt færre figurer deltager ved angrebets begyndelse, betragtes det som angreb uden ordre (jf. 07.01.3), således at storm ikke kan anvendes.

- 03.03.6 Ved skydning med håndvåben angives tidspunkt i trækket, hvor der skydes. Ordren kan relateres til bestemte terrængenstande (skyd, når modstanderen passerer skovhjørnet) eller til angreb (skydning "før chokkast") eller til en anden på ordredslen defineret handling. Indtræder den forventede begivenhed ikke, kan enheden ikke skyde i trækket (se dog 04.02.13).
- 03.03.7 Ved skydning med artilleri angives ammunitionstype, gættet afstand og tidspunkt i trækket, hvor der skydes. Skydning kan relateres til terrængenstande eller begivenheder, som anført i 03.03.6.

"Franklin then advanced rapidly to the hill where Jackson's troops had been stationed, feeling the woods with shot as he progressed. (Longstreet, James: The Battle of Fredericksburg, in Battles & Leaders, vol. 3, p. 78).

"The Federal battery, with muzzles elevated and the trails thrust into trenches, threw occasional shells upon the heights, and parties of skirmishers were sent across the river to develop the Confederate strength." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 297 on the Battle of McDowell, 1962).



## 04.00.0 TRÆKKET

### 04.01.0 Trækkets forløb

- 04.01.1 Før trækket begynder, lægger spillerne ordrer for deres taktiske enheder (jf. 03.01.2). Dette bør højst vare 5 minutter.
- 04.01.2 Ved trækkets start meldes først alle angreb, derefter retræter for nedholdte enheder og endelig alle skydninger. Desuden oplyses om alle synlige feltarbejder.
- 04.01.3 Enheder, der vil skyde straks, gør dette. Nedholdte enheder, der har erklæret retræte, er ikke nedholdt ved en beskydning i begyndelsen af trækket (jf. 04.02.8).
- 04.01.4 Herefter foretages flytninger, idet skydninger og chokkast gennemføres i henhold til ordrerne. Samtidig gennemføres tvungne handlinger (jf. 04.02.0).
- 04.01.5 Til sidst forsøges reorganisering (jf. 08.04.0) og udnævnelse af nye generaler (jf. 08.05.0).
- 04.01.6 Spillerne totaliserer tabene for hver enhed og lægger ordrer til næste træk.

### 04.02.0 Tvungne handlinger

- 04.02.1 En enhed, der kommer i fuldstændig uorden (FU) i løbet af trækket (jf. 08.02.6), skal uanset allerede udførte handlinger og uden beregning af tid straks flygte 1/2 træk med ryggen til årsagen (se dog 08.03.4). Opsiddet kavaleri flygter dog et helt træk.
- 04.02.2 En enhed i FU ved trækkets begyndelse skal uanset ordre flygte hele trækket væk fra modstanderen, hvis muligt mod egen bagkant.

"The shells fell in quick succession amongst the disordered ranks of the Southern regiments, and not all the efforts of their officers could stay their flight." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 144 on First Bull Run, 1861).

- 04.02.3 En enhed, der kommer i uorden (U) i løbet af trækket (jf. 08.02.5), skal uanset allerede udførte handlinger og uden beregning af tid straks retirere 1/2 træks almindelig march fra årsagen (uanset 02.06.2, se dog 04.02.5).
- 04.02.4 En enhed i U ved trækkets begyndelse, der straks beskydes og lider tab, skal uanset ordre retirere hele trækket (jf. 02.06.2).

"Now that some of these troops had been driven back, they must be identified, reorganized, and put back into the fight." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants a Study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1942, Vol 1, p. 64).

- 04.02.5 En enhed, der ikke kan foretage gennemmarch (jf. 02.06.3), standser ved brikkontakt (se også 04.02.9). Enheder i U eller FU kan ikke vige uden om egne enheder for at undgå forsøg på at gennemmarchere eller medrive dem (jf. 08.03.0).
- 04.02.6 Opsiddet kavaleri og påprodset artilleri, der kommer i let uorden

(LU, jf. 08.02.3) som følge af beskydning inden for 15 cm, skal uanset tidligere handlinger i trækkes straks foretage vending uden beregning af tid og bevæge sig væk fra modstanderen i resten af trækkes.

- 04.02.7 Infanteri og afsiddet kavaleri, der kommer i LU som følge af beskydning inden for 15 cm, bliver nedholdt (NH) i resten af dette og hele næste træk (jf. 08.02.4). En nedholdt enhed, der modtager tab som følge af beskydning inden for 15 cm, bliver nedholdt igen.

"On the attacking side there were many pressures acting against a resolute assault, apart from the enemy's appearance. The gruesome spectacle of the attackers' own wounded and dead would naturally create a deep impression, while the disintegration of drill would remove an important motor of unified action. The insidious doctrine that battles were supposed to be fought by firing must also have created a psychological barrier to forward movement and in any case it was always easier to stand still doing something familiar than to venture into the unknown." (Griffith, Paddy: Rally Once Again Battle in the American Civil War, The Crowood Press, Wiltshire 1987, p. 150).

"The order to lie down is theoretically infrequent, but practically it is often given in modern warfare. Napoleons maxim that 'an army travels on its belly' was metaphorical, but long-range and repeating rifles have gone far to make it true in a literal sense." (Ames, John W.: In front of the Stone Wall at Fredericksburg, in Battles & Leaders, vol. 3, p. 123).

- 04.02.8 En enhed, der bliver nedholdt, kan ikke bevæge sig i resten af trækkes (se dog 04.02.10). I det efterfølgende træk kan den kun bevæge sig ved at erklære retræte i begyndelsen af trækkes. Dermed ophører nedholdelsen, og enheden kommer straks i U (jf. 04.02.3).
- 04.02.9 En enhed infanteri eller afsiddet kavaleri, som forsøger at gennemmarchere en nedholdt enhed, kommer selv i LU og bliver nedholdt, med mindre den har meldt angreb og opnår resultat 10 eller højere ved et kast med to terninger. Den angribende enheds valeur lægges til kastet.
- 04.02.10 En enhed i kæde, der trues af en fjendtlig enhed på en afstand af 8 cm, kan uanset tidligere handlinger og uden beregning af tid vælge straks at gå et helt træk almindelig march tilbage. Såfremt den herved opnår kontakt med en støtteenhed (jf. 07.03.6), opstilles den på støtteenhedens flanker, stadig i kæde. Går kæden et helt træk tilbage uden at komme i kontakt med en støtteenhed, kommer den i LU.

"The bombardment for the purpose of dislodging the sharp-shooters who under cover of the houses were delaying the bridge-making, was terrific, while a smoke settled down and veiled the scene. After the bombardment had failed to dislodge the enemy, the 7th Michigan and the 19th and 20th Massachusetts of Howard's division sprang into the pontoons, and rowing themselves over drove away Barksdale's sharp-shooters. This gallant action enabled the engineers to complete the bridges." (Couch, Darius N.: Sumner's "Right Grand Division", in Battles & Leaders, vol. 3, p. 108).

"As soon as Evans had learned that the Unionists were moving beyond his position, he had left the skirmish line in front of Stone Bridge with two companies in support, had sent word to his immediate superior that he was abandoning his position, and unhesitatingly, with his 1100 men and his two 6-pounder smooth-bore guns, had challenged the advance of the foe. Then he had put up as stout resistance as could have been offered in the face of such odds ! His casualties, 12 per cent of his engaged force, had been entailed in heavy fighting and not in a mere delaying action." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants a Study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1942, Vol 1, p. 86).

- 04.02.11 En kæde, der har for stor brikafstand i henhold til 02.01.5 eller 02.02.4, skal uanset tidligere handlinger i trækket bruge resten af trækket på at omformere.
- 04.02.12 Afprodset artilleri, der trues af en fjendtlig enhed på en afstand af 8 cm, kan uanset tidligere handlinger og uden beregning af tid vælge straks at anbringe artilleristerne bag en egen enhed i sluttet formation inden for 8 cm.

"Along the edge of the pines Jackson placed his regiments , with six guns to support them. Lying in rear of the guns were the 4th and 27th Virginia; on the right was the 5th; on the left were the 2nd and 33rd." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 146 on First Bull Run, 1861).

- 04.02.13 En stationær enhed, der bliver angrebet, kan uanset ordrer vælge at skyde en forsvarsskydning som overrasket. Dette gælder dog ikke enheder, der allerede har bevæget sig eller skudt i trækket, som er blevet gennemmarcheret, eller som har ordre til skydning "efter chokkast". Forsvarsskydningen foretages "før chokkast" (jf. 07.02.2).

"Without a moment's hesitation the regiment charged with a yell across the bridge, and so sudden was the rush that the Federal artillerymen were surprised. The gun was double-shotted with canister, and the head of the column should have been swept away. But the aim was high and the Confederates escaped." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 371, on Cross Keys, 1862).

- 04.02.14 Infanteri og afsiddet kavaleri, der i mindst 2 på hinanden følgende træk har skudt mod samme mål inden for 8 cm, kan ikke ophøre med skydningen, med mindre målet trækker sig tilbage til en afstand, der er over 15 cm, eller enheden løber tør for ammunition. Der kan dog erklæres retræte som ved nedholdte enheder (jf. 04.02.8).



## 05.00.0 SKYDNING MED HÅNDVÅBEN

### 05.01.0 Hvem kan skyde

- 05.01.1 Kun enheder med skudordre (jf. 03.03.6) eller overraskede enheder (jf. 04.02.13) kan skyde. Den skydende enhed skal have ammunition.
- 05.01.2 Den maksimale sidevinkel er 30 grader mellem frontretning og skudretning. Der måles fra fronten af den skydende enhed. Kan figuren i første geled nå, kan en bagvedstående figur også nå. Omvendt kan en bagvedstående figur kun deltage, hvis den foranstående figur kan deltage. Kun figurer i de to forreste geledder kan deltage i en skydning. Der kan ikke skydes igennem skyttekæder.

"On the 10th and 11th [May] the Confederates made forced marches, but the enemy set fire to the forests on the mountain-side, and this desperate measure proved eminently successful. The sky was overcast with volumes of smoke [writes Dabney], which wrapped every distant object in a veil, impenetrable alike to the eyes and telescopes of the officers. Through this sultry canopy the pursuing army felt its way cautiously, cannonaded by the enemy from every advantageous position, while it was protected from ambuscades only by detachments of skirmishers, who scoured the burning woods on either side of the highway." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 301 after the Battle of McDowell, 1962).

- 05.01.3 For at der kan opnås virkning, skal målet være inden for skudvidde (jf. skema IV). Der måles fra midten af de skydende figurers front til nærmeste brikkant på målet. Den skydende kan bestemme, at kun en del af enheden skyder, f.eks. for at skyde på en gunstigere afstand. Resten af enheden skyder da pr. definition på et andet tidspunkt, evt. lige før eller lige efter.
- 05.01.4 Antallet af skydeenheder beregnes ved at dividere skytternes antal med nedennævnte tal. Bliver der herved en rest på mindst det i parenteser nævnte antal figurer, forhøjes antallet af skydeenheder med en.
- 05.01.5
- |  |       |
|--|-------|
| Opsiddet kavaleri i sluttet formation .....                | 6 (3) |
| Opsiddet kavaleri i kæde .....                             | 4 (2) |
| Afsiddet kavaleri i sluttet formation eller tynd linie ... | 7 (4) |
| Afsiddet kavaleri i kæde .....                             | 5 (3) |
| Infanteri i sluttet formation eller tynd linie .....       | 6 (3) |
| Infanteri i kæde .....                                     | 4 (2) |
- 05.01.6 Enheder, der er nedholdt (jf. 04.02.7), bruger dobbelt så mange figurer pr. skydeenhed som ovenfor angivet.

### 05.02.0 Beregning af ildvirkning

- 05.02.1 Der kastes med to terninger. Summen af disse modificeres med tillæg/fradrag fra skema V. Resultatet aflæses i skema VI, der viser tab i mand pr. skydeenhed.

"The sharp-shooters having got range of our embrasures, we began to suffer." (Owen, William Miller: A hot day on Marye's Heights, in Battles & Leaders, vol. 3, p. 99).

"There were some nine models of smoothbore flintlocks made at government armories or by contract after 1800, most in .69 calibre. Of these the best known was the U.S. Flintlock, Model of 1822. .... The



percussion system of ignition came into use in the U.S. in 1841 with the U.S. Percussion musket, Model of 1841 (NB: af andre betegnet M 42). Many of these .69 caliber smoothbores were rifled early in the fifties and became the U.S. Minie-rifle, .69 calibre. The famous "Mississippi" rifle, Model of 1841, .54 round ball also saw much service. .... In addition, there were quantities of a variety of European weapons; some, such as the two grooved Brunswicks were obsolete and nearly worthless". (Coggins, Jack: Arms and Equipment of the Civil War, Doubleday, New York 1962, p. 31).

"Accuracy with the Sharps was probably better than with the muzzle loaders. Some tall stories have come down about its performance in the hands of Brendan's famous sharpshooters. However, it must be remembered that these were picked shots, and if they could drop a man at 700 yards, so could a skilled shooter with a Springfield. The main thing was that its rate of fire was at least three times as great." (Coggins, Jack: Arms and Equipment of the Civil War, Doubleday, New York 1962, p. 34).

"Tests in the United States gave the mean vertical deviation at 500 yards of the U.S. Model 1855 Rifle Musket as 15 inches and horizontal 13 inches, and that of the Enfield as 20 and 17 inches, respectively." (Coggins, Jack: Arms and Equipment of the Civil War, Doubleday, New York 1962, p. 38).

"It may be well to note how inaccurate were the smoothbores of the time. At 50 yards they were good that is, they could be relied on to place most of their shots in an 18 inch circle. At 100 this circle was more likely to be about 3 4 feet. Over 100 yards, accuracy fell off alarmingly. It is safe to say that a man at 200 yards stood little risk of being hit by a stray bullet. .... The rifled muskets firing a round ball did better. At 100 yards the model 1841 "Mississippi" could hit a target the size of a man's head pretty consistently. At 200 the old Baker (Britain's first army rifle) could hit a man most of the time, but at 300 even the 1841 could score less than 25 per cent of hits on a target eight feet square. .... The conical bullet was a vast improvement, and now a reasonable percentage of hits could be expected at 500 yards. A trained rifleman, with a British Enfield, could expect to hit a man size target about half the time at 500 yards. .... There is considerable written about accuracy in rifles, and most of it is misleading. It is all very well to speak of weapons with ranges of so many hundreds of yards. The truth is that few people are capable of hitting a man size target offhand at more than three hundred yards, even with a modern high powered rifle. .... Carabines were well suited to cavalry operations. Accuracy was fair, considering the short barrels and comparatively weak loads. Some were capable of making a good percentage of hits at 500 yards (machine rest), but 150 200 yards was considered effective range." (Coggins, Jack: Arms and Equipment of the Civil War, Doubleday, New York 1962, p. 28, 38 & 58).

"The accepted philosophy of the US Ordnance Board before 1865 was that an infantry weapon should be reliable, robust and 'soldier proof'; it should have long range, good accuracy, a powerful projectile, and (in order to reduce ammunition consumption) a relatively low rate of fire. When the Enfield or Springfield muzzle loader was compared with any breach-loader available during the war, it fared better in every single one of these tests." (Griffith, Paddy: Rally Once Again Battle in the American Civil War, The Crowood Press, Wiltshire 1987, p. 81).

"Only handpicked and expertly trained shots could have hoped to score hits on the Civil War battlefield at more than 150 yards, but such soldiers were as hard to find as the ammunition needed to give them target practice. .... 35th Massachusetts in 1962, despite being armed with Enfields, considered that 300 yards was out of range of the enemy. Its main line lay down in the open at this distance, sending skirmishers nearer. .... Studies of the Second World War and the Korean War suggest that normal combat ranges were about 100 yards, and in Vietnam the figure was still lower. There is therefore a fallacy in believing that longer range weapons automatically produce longer range fire. The range of firing has more to do with the range of visibility, the intentions of the firer and the general climate of moral in the army." (Griffith, Paddy: Rally Once Again Battle in the American Civil War, The Crowood Press, Wiltshire 1987, p. 148-149. Et skema p. 147, oplyser at 113 referencer til faktiske skudafstande i borgerkrigen giver i gennemsnit 127 yards, med 100 yards på 58 referencer i perioden 61 62).

"The rifles (muzzle-loaders) used throughout the war by both Federals and Confederates compare as follows with more modern weapons:

	Sighted to	Effective range
American [Springfield]	1,000 yards	250 yards
Needle-gun (1866 and 1870)	660 "	250 "

Chassepot (1870)	.	.	.	.	1,320 "	350 "
Martini-Henry	.	.	.	.	2,100 "	400 "
Magazine	.	.	.	.	3,200 "	450 "

By effective range is meant the distance where, under ordinary conditions, the enemy's losses are sufficient to stop his advance. The effective range of the Brown Bess was about 60 yards." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 140).

"The lofty heights held by the Confederates were but an illusory advantage. So steep were the slopes in front that the men, for the most part, had to stand on the crest to deliver their fire, and their line stood out in bold relief against the evening sky. On the other hand, says Dabney, though the Federal troops had to scale the steep acclivity of the hill, they reaped the usual advantage in such cases, resulting from the high firing of the Confederates." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 299 on the Battle of McDowell, 1962).

"The batteries opened upon the solid columns of the Federal horse. The Louisiana regiments, deploying at the double, dashed forward, and the Northern squadrons, penned in the narrow streets, found themselves assailed by a heavy fire. A desperate attempt was made to escape towards Winchester, and a whirling cloud of dust through which sabres gleamed swept northward up the turnpike. But Ashby's horsemen, galloping across country, headed off the fugitives; some of the Confederate infantry drew an abandoned waggon across the road, and others ran forward to the roadside fences. At such close quarters the effect of musketry was terrible." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 331 on Middletown, 1962).

- 05.02.2 Det samlede tab noteres på den beskydte enheds ordreseddel. Har denne hermed mistet 20 mand (inkl. tidligere tab), fjernes en figur.
- 05.02.3 Såfremt der fjernes en eller flere figurer, skal enheden straks teste moral (jf. 08.02.7).
- 05.02.4 Første gang en enhed skyder i spillet, får den et tillæg på 3 point. Har en enhed i øvrigt ikke skudt i forrige træk, får den et tillæg på 1 point (jf. skema V).
- 05.02.5 Ved beskydning af kolonner, der er sammensat af flere enheder, modtager den forreste enhed tab efter egne forhold, og de bagvedstående modtager alene de ekstra tab, som følger af geledevirkningen.
- 05.02.6 Enheder, der er nedholdt (jf. 04.02.7), lider kun halve tab.
- 05.02.7 Såfremt en general befinder sig i brikkontakt med en enhed, der lider tab som følge af beskydning, falder generalen, såfremt resultatet af selve terningkastet er 10.

## 06.00.0 SKYDNING MED ARTILLERI

### 06.01.0 Hvem kan skyde

- 06.01.1 Kun enheder med skudordre (jf. 03.03.7) eller overraskede enheder (jf. 04.02.13) kan skyde.
- 06.01.2 For at kunne skyde skal batteriet være afprodset og have ammunition.
- 06.01.3 Skydeenheden er batteriet. Der skal være 1/2 figur (artillerist) for hver pjece, batteriet havde i virkeligheden, der medregnes ved skydningen.
- 06.01.4 Den højeste sidevinkel, batteriet kan skyde inden for, er 45 grader mellem frontretning og skudlinie, målt ved batteriets fløje.
- 06.01.5 Overskydning med granat fra haubits kræver mindst 10 cm afstand mellem batteriet og den overskudte enhed og mellem denne og det trufne punkt. Overskydning fra kanon eller overskydning med fuldkugle kræver desuden overhøjde. Overskydning er ikke mulig med kardæsk.

### 06.02.0 Beregning af træfning

- 06.02.1 Ved skydning med kardæsk vælges et eller flere mål inden for skudvinklen (jf. 06.01.4) og kardæskzonen (jf. skema VII), idet ethvert mål kan træffes, med mindre det dækkes af en enhed i sluttet formation, eller der inden for samme halvdel af skudvinklen findes en egen enhed, som er tættere på batteriet end målet. Virkning beregnes mod de to forreste geledder og de foran disse stående kæder. Tabene fordeles proportionalt mellem de valgte mål.

"The main effect of artillery came at what may be described as 'canister range' the last 300 yards to the gun, sometimes extending to 500 yards. .... Problems arose for the gunners, however, on those occasions when infantry succeeded in coming within their (i.e. the infantry's) normal firing range, that is to say within about 200 yards." (Griffith, Paddy: Rally Once Again Battle in the American Civil War, The Crowood Press, Wiltshire 1987, p. 170 & 168).

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- 06.02.2 Ved skydning med granat eller fuldkugle udpeges et mål, og der kastes herefter for afvigelsen, som udgør 10% af den gættede afstand. Der anvendes 2 terninger. Resultatet fremgår af skema VIII. Herefter udmåles den opnåede afstand i skudretningen for at se om målet eller en anden enhed i skudretningen til målet er truffet. Den korrekte afstand til eventuelle mål må ikke udmåles i denne forbindelse.

"The musketry fire was very heavy, and the artillery fire was simply terrible. I sent word several times to our artillery on the right of Falmouth that they were firing into us, and were tearing our own men to

pieces. I thought they had made a mistake in the range. But I learned later that the fire came from the guns of the enemy on their extreme left." (Couch, Darius N.: Sumner's "Right Grand Division", in Battles & Leaders, vol. 3, p. 115).

"Owing to the foggy character of the day our artillery on the left bank of the Rappahannock was obliged to fire somewhat at random, and for the same reason the fire from the enemy's batteries was not very well directed." (Smith, William Ferrar: Franklin's "Left Grand Division", in Battles & Leaders, vol. 3, p. 135).

"The American rifled artillery was effective, in clear weather, at 2,000 yards, the 12-pounder smooth-bore at 1,600, the 6-pounder at 1,200." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 140).

"The main body followed in two parallel columns, and the line of march soon brought them within range of the commanding batteries on Pritchard's Hill. At a range of little more than a mile the enemy's gunners poured a heavy fire on the serried ranks, and Carpenter, unlimbering near the Opequon Church, sought to distract their aim. The Confederate infantry, about 2,000 all told, although moving in mass, and delayed by fences and marshy ground, passed unscathed under the storm of shell, and in twenty minutes the advanced guard had seized the wooden ridge." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 240 on Kernstown, 1862).

06.02.3 Såfremt en enhed har figurbrikker på det trufne punkt, er denne enhed truffet. Ved skydning med fuldkugle, hvor der er opnået træfning, medregnes ved beregningen af tab de geledder fra den trufne enhed og andre enheder, som er inden for 10 cm i skudretningen efter det trufne punkt.

06.02.4 Ved beskydning af geledder fra flere enheder modtager den forreste enhed tab efter egne forhold, og de bagvedstående modtager alene de ekstra tab, som følger af geledvirkningen.

06.02.5 Ved fortsat skydning mod et truffet mål opnås der altid træfning, med mindre der skiftes ammunition, eller målet bevæger sig mindst 8 cm.

"By repeated firing, the Federals had found the exact range of Walker's position and they pounded it mercilessly." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants a study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1944, vol. 2, p. 357 on Fredericksburg).

### 06.03.0 Beregning af ildvirkning

06.03.1 Er træfning opnået, kastes to terninger. Summen af disse modificeres med tillæg/fradrag fra skema IX. Resultatet aflæses i skema X, der viser tab i mand pr. batteri.

"There was some difference of opinion among artillerymen as to the relative merits of smoothbore and rifled canon. One Confederate Chief of Ordnance said, 'We especially valued the 3" rifles, which became the favorite field piece'. General J.D. Imboden, C.S.A. gave his opinion and also pointed out one disadvantage of the rifled gun. At Bull Run his guns were in an action against the six 10 pounder Parrots of Rickett's, and Griffin's battery of four 10 pounders and two 12 pounder howitzers. 'These last hurt us more than all the rifles of both batteries, since the shot and the shell of the rifles, striking the ground at any angle over fifteen or twenty degrees, almost without exception bored their way in several feet and did no harm.'" (Coggins, Jack: Arms and Equipment of the Civil War, Doubleday, New York 1962, p. 64).

"The rifles fired shell at such a high velocity that they often dug themselves into the ground and

exploded at a harmless depth. Many shells were defective, especially in the Confederate service, and they usually had to be of an especially small calibre for use with rifled guns. The small calibre also meant that these guns gave a poor performance with canister rounds, which left them with enviably high accuracy but lamentably low killing power. .... Early in the war McClellan had decided that the Army of the Potomac needed only one rifle for every two smoothbores, but he never succeeded in bringing the ratio down to less than two rifles to each smoothbore; nor could Hunt force it much lower when he tried to get rid of some of the rifles after Fredericksburg." (Griffith, Paddy: Rally Once Again Battle in the American Civil War, The Crowood Press, Wiltshire 1987, p. 169).

"Only three pieces of artillery took part in the engagement. These were Federal guns; but so great was the angle of elevation that but one man on Slington's Hill was struck by a piece of shell." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 300 on the Battle of McDowall, 1962).

"The ground in front of his [Federal] position was fairly open and with his two pieces of artillery he was able to check the first rush of the Confederate infantry. The guns which had accompanied their advance guard were only smoothbores, and it was some time before a battery capable of making effective reply to the Federal pieces was brought up." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 318 on Front Royal, 1862).

06.03.2 Tabet noteres på den beskydte enheds ordreseddel. Har denne herved mistet 20 mand inkl. tidligere tab, fjernes en figur, og der testes straks moral (jf. 08.02.7).

06.03.3 Ved kontrabatteriskydning opnås tillige evt. et materieltab. Der anvendes samme terningkast, men kun med fradrag fra skema XI. Resultatet aflæses også i skema XI. Tab i heste er angivet i figurer, mens beskadigelse og ødelæggelse af pjece og prods omfatter en af de pjecer eller et af de prods, enheden havde i virkeligheden. Kardæsk har kun virkning mod heste.

06.03.4 Beskydning af en ammunitionsvogn regnes som mod påprodset artilleri. Såfremt ammunitionsvognen bliver truffet eller er i brikkontakt med et batteri, der bliver truffet, beregnes der materieltab som ved kontrabatteriskydning. Ammunitionsvognen bliver dog ødelagt ved resultat 7 eller højere (jf. skema XI).

06.03.5 Har et batteri mistet halvdelen af sine heste, halveres dets marchlængde, og der kan ikke anvendes storm. Er alle heste faldet, kan batteriet kun bevæge sig afprodset.


"They requisitioned two plough horses and, under the eyes of Federal pickets, brought the piece a fine 10 pounder Parrot back to Front Royal." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants a study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1944, vol. 1, p. 382 on the Valley Campaign).

06.03.6 En beskadiget pjece eller et beskadiget prods kan repareres af 1 figur (artillerist) på 2 træk. Foretages reparationen under effektivt beskydning, tager det dog 3 træk. Reparationen kan ikke foretages i træk, hvor batteriet angribes eller deltager i nærkamp.

06.03.7 Hvis der ved skydning med et 10 pd Parrot batteri slås to enere for at afgøre tab (jf. skema IX og X), eksploderer den ene af de pjecer, batteriet havde i virkeligheden.

"The Parrot rifled muzzle loaders were accurate long range weapons, but they had an unenviable reputation for bursting." (Rogers, H.C.B.: The Confederates and Federals at War, Ian Allan, London 1973, p. 67).

- 06.03.8 Enheder, der er nedholdt (jf. 04.02.7), lider kun halve tab.
- 06.03.9 Såfremt en general befinder sig i brikkontakt med en enhed, der lider tab som følge af beskydning, falder generalen, såfremt resultatet af selve terningkastet er 10.



## 07.00.0 ANGREB

### 07.01.0 Hvem kan angribe

07.01.1 Et angreb består af en fremrykning til indbrudsafstand, et chokkast, en eventuel forsvarsskydning før eller efter chokkastet, fremrykning til brikkontakt og nærkamp (jf. 07.02.0). Indbrudsafstanden er 2 cm mellem angriberens front og modstanderens nærmeste punkt.

"The New York cavalry, pressed at every point, were beginning to waver; and near the little hamlet of Cedarville, some three miles from his last position, Kenly gave orders for his infantry to check the pursuit. The column had halted. Men were tearing down the fences, and the companies were forming for battle in the fields, when there was a sudden outcry, the rolling thunder of many hoofs, and the sharp rattle of pistol-shots. A dense cloud of dust came whirling down the turnpike, and emerging from the yellow canopy the New York troopers, riding for their lives, dashed through the ranks of the startled infantry, while the Confederate horsemen, extending far to right and left, came surging on their traces. The leading squadron, keeping to the high road, was formed four abreast, and the deep mass was wedged tightly between the fences. The foremost files were mowed down by a volley at close range, and here, for a moment, the attack was checked. But the Virginians meant riding home. On either flank the supporting squadrons galloped swiftly forward, and up the road and across the fields, while the earth shook beneath their tread, swept their charging lines, the men yelling in their excitement and horses as frenzied as their riders. In vain the Federal officers tried to deploy their companies. Kenly, calling on them to rally to the colours, was cut down with a dreadful wound. The grey troopers fell on them before they could fix bayonets or form a front, and sabre and revolver found an easy mark in the crowded masses of panic-stricken infantry. One of the guns was surrounded, and the gunners were cut to pieces; the other escaped for the moment, but was soon abandoned; and with the appearance of a fresh Confederate squadron on the scene Kenly's whole force dispersed in flight. Through woods and orchards the chase went on. Escape was impossible. Hundreds laid down their arms; and 250 Virginia horsemen, resolutely handled and charging at exactly the right moment, had the honour of bringing in as prisoners 600 Federals, including 20 officers and a complete section of artillery. The enemy lost in addition 32 killed and 122 wounded. The Confederate casualties were 11 killed and 15 wounded, and so sudden and vigorous was their attack that a Federal colonel estimated their numbers at 3,000." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 319 on Front Royal, 1862).

07.01.2 Enhver enhed, der under fremrykning kommer på indbrudsafstand af en modstander, overgår uanset ordre til angreb, med mindre angrebet ikke kan foretages (jf. 07.01.4 og 07.01.5).

07.01.3 Enheder, der foretager angreb uden ordre (jf. 03.03.5), får et fradrag ved chokkastet (jf. 07.03.2).

07.01.4 Artilleri og enheder i U eller FU kan ikke foretage angreb og standser derfor på indbrudsafstand.

07.01.5 Der kan kun foretages frontalangreb på en enhed 1 gang i hvert træk, idet senere frontalangreb standses på indbrudsafstand, uanset om tidligere angreb er afvist inden chokkast (jf. 07.02.1).

07.01.6 Såfremt en enhed har meldt angreb, og den rykker et helt stormtræk uden mindst at komme på indbrudsafstand af modstanderen, kommer den i LU ved trækkets slutning. Dette gælder også, hvis enheden støder på en for våbenarten impassabel hindring, idet angreb ikke kan udføres henover en sådan.

## 07.02.0 Angrebets forløb

07.02.1 Et angreb afbrydes straks, såfremt angriberen ved beskydning bliver nedholdt (jf. 04.02.7) eller kommer i FU eller U (jf. 04.0-2.1 og 04.02.3).

"As soon as possible I opened fire on the enemy's column, who immediately advanced in good order upon me until he approached within 60 or 80 paces, when the effectiveness of the fire threw his column in considerable disorder, on perceiving which I immediately ordered a charge, which being brilliantly and energetically executed by my whole line, the enemy broke in confusion and fled." (Toombs rapport om Antietam, citeret p. 223 i bind 2 af Douglas S. Freeman: Lee's Lieutenants a study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1944).

"A little before noon I sent orders to all my batteries to open fire through the streets or at any points where the troops were seen about the city, as a diversion in favor of Jackson. This fire began at once to develop the work hand for myself. The Federal troops swarmed out of the city like bees out of a hive, coming in double-quick march and filling the edge of the field in front Cobb. This was just where we had expected attack, and I was prepared meet it. As the troops massed before us, they were much annoyed by the fire of our batteries. The field was literally packed with Federals from the vast number of troops that had been massed in the town. From the moment of their appearance began the most fearful carnage. With our artillery front, right, and left tearing through their ranks, the Federals pressed forward with almost invincible determination, maintaining their steady step and closing up their broken ranks. Thus resolutely they marched upon stone fence behind which quietly waited the Confederate brigade of General Cobb. As they came within reach of this brigade, a storm of lead was poured into their advancing ranks and they were swept from the field like chaff before the wind. A cloud of smoke shut out the scene for a moment and, rising, revealed the shattered fragments recoiling from their gallant but hopeless charge. The artillery still plowed through their retreating ranks and searched the places of concealment into which the troops had plunged. A vast number went pell-mell into an old railroad cut to escape fire from the right and front. A battery on Lee's Hill saw this and turned its fire into the entire length of the cut, and the shells began to pour down upon the Federals with the most frightful destruction. They found their position of refuge more uncomfortable than the field of the assault." (Longstreet, James: The Battle of Fredericksburg, in Battles & Leaders, vol. 3, p. 79).

"I think the fourth time the Federals charged, a gallant fellow came within one hundred feet of Cobb's position before he fell. Close behind him came some few scattering ones, but they were either killed or they fled from certain death. (Note: In his official report General Lafayette McLaws says: "The body of one man, believed to be an officer, was found within about thirty yards of the stone-wall, and other single bodies were scattered at increased distances until the main mass of dead lay thickly strewn over the ground at something over one hundred yards off and extending to the ravine, commencing at the point where our men would allow the enemy's column to approach before opening fire, and beyond which no organized body of men was able to pass." Editors)." (Longstreet, James: The Battle of Fredericksburg, in Battles & Leaders, vol. 3, p. 81).

"At intervals, in front, preceded by horse-artillery and flanked on either side by numerous field-pieces, hundreds of heavy fieldpieces from the north bank of the Rappahannock belched forth their missiles of destruction and swept the plain in advance of Franklin's columns, while at the same moment his smaller field-pieces in front and on the banks joined in to sweep the open space on all sides. This mighty cannonading was answered by the Confederate ordnance. Onward, steady and unwavering, these three lines advanced, preceded by a heavy skirmish line, till they neared the railroad, when Jackson's right and right center poured into these sturdy ranks a deadly volley from small-arms. Spaces, gaps, and wide chasms instantly told the tale of a most fatal encounter. Volley after volley of small-arms continued the work of destruction, while Jackson's artillery posted on the Federal left and at right angles to their line of advance kept up a withering fire on the lessening ranks. The enemy advanced far in front of the River road [and crossing the railroad charged the slopes upon which our troops were posted], but at length wavered, halted, and suddenly retreated to the protection of the railroad embankments. The struggle was kept up by sharpshooters for some time, when another general advance was made against a furious cannonade of small-arms and artillery." (Moore, J.H.: With Jackson at Hamilton's Crossing, in Battles & Leaders, vol. 3, p. 139).



"In short time their thunderous counterattack restored the line. To achieve this, the Confederates had to give and take fire at ten paces, and even then, they won only the briefest of respites. Back came the Federals to the assault." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants a study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1944, vol. 2, p. 115).

"The Federal infantry gave way in great disorder. The cavalry in support essayed a charge, but the Confederates, as the squadrons rode boldly towards them, halted, where they stood, and the rolling volleys of the line of battle drove back the horsemen with many empty saddles." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 339, on Winchester).

07.02.2 Angriberen rykker frem til indbrudsafstand, og såfremt modstanderen har valgt at skyde "før chokkast", gennemføres denne skydning umiddelbart før indbrudsafstand nås.

"Jackson's men were lying beneath the crest of the plateau. Only one of his regiments, the 33rd, had as yet been engaged in the open, and his guns in front still held their own. Riding to the centre of his line, where the 2nd and 4th Virginia stationed, he gave orders for a counterstroke. 'Reserve your fire till they come within fifty yards, and give them the bayonet; and when you charge, yell like furies!' Right well did the hot Virginian blood respond." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 151 on First Bull Run, 1861).

07.02.3 Angriberen kaster nu chokkast (jf. 07.03.0), og såfremt modstanderen bevarer orden ved chokkastet, afbrydes angrebet på indbrudsafstand. Opsiddet kavaleri, der angriber andre våbenarter, skal i så tilfælde straks foretage vending og bevæge sig væk fra modstanderen i resten af trækket.

07.02.4 Såfremt modstanderen kommer mindst i LU ved chokkastet, fortsættes fremrykningen, og hvis enhederne opnår brikkontakt, udkæmpes nærkamp i næste træk. Overfløjende figurer kan inden for almindelig marchlængde føres til brikkontakt med modstanderens sider for at deltage i nærkampen.

"At that moment, those traitorous war gods, Chance and Blunder, who had fought all morning against the Southerners, turned on the Federals. Through the smoke, there galloped boldly up the hill of the Henry House from the Federal position two magnificent batteries, eleven guns, which opened fire immediately against the Confederate artillery. Thee Union infantry support was slow in coming up. As it was forming on the right of the batteries, it was disorganized by a short cavalry charge, which Col. J. E. B. Stuart led. About the same time, three of the Federal guns on the hill were moved to the right, as if to enfilade the Confederate batteries. The Union artillerists sprang to these advanced pieces and fired two rounds, but this time they had ventured too far. Col. A. C. Cummings of the Thirty-third Virginia, a veteran of the Mexican War, saw the opportunity. Without waiting to ask the approval of his brigade commander, Cummings shouted to his men to charge. A roar and a volley--the Virginians were upon the Federals. Farther along the front, every one of Jackson's men who could bring a musket to bear on the Federal gunners was firing fast. The artillerists were cut down. Both batteries were silenced. The Thirty-third Virginia reached the guns, the first captured that day, but soon the regiment had to abandon the coveted pieces and to fall back because of a concentrated fire from the Union infantry on the hillside." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants a Study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1942, Vol 1, p. 68).

07.02.5 Angriber kan vælge ikke at forfølge en modstander i U eller FU, og i stedet foretage angreb mod et nyt mål inden for den resterende marchlængde.

"Seminary ridge was cleared, though some blue units fought valiantly to cover the retreat. Beyond that high ground, General Hill did not think it was prudent to advance his exhausted and now disordered

troops." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants a study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1944, vol. 3, p. 88 on Gettysburg).

"The centre had been completely broken by Jackson's charge; the right was giving way, and the Confederates, manning the captured guns, turned them on the masses which covered the fields below. .... Another Confederate brigade, under General Early, had now arrived, and again the enemy's right was overthrown, while Beauregard, leaving Jackson, whose brigade had lost all order and many men in its swift advance, to hold the plateau, swept forward towards the Matthews Hill." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 152 on First Bull Run, 1861).

"It is true that the Confederate troops were no more fit for offensive operations than McDowell's troops. Our army, says General Johnston, was more disorganised by victory than that of the United States by defeat." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 154 on First Bull Run, 1861).

"To the misconduct of Ashby's troopers, and to the pedantic folly of general Steuart, the escape of the Federal army must be attributed. 'Never have I seen an opportunity when it was in the power of the cavalry to reap a richer harvest of the fruits of victory. Had the cavalry played its part in the pursuit as well as the four companies under Colonel Flournoy two days before in the pursuit from Front Royal, but a small portion of Banks' army would have made its escape to the Potomac.' So runs Jackson's official report, and when the disorganised condition of the Federal battalions, as they fled north from Winchester, is recalled, it is difficult to question the opinion therein expressed." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 342, on Winchester, 1862).

### 07.03.0 Chokkast

07.03.1 Chokkast kastes af angriberen. Såfremt begge parter angriber (jf. 07.01.2), kastes chokkastet af den, der har initiativet. Kan dette ikke afgøres på anden måde, rafler parterne, om hvem der har initiativet.

07.03.2 Der kastes med to terninger. Summen af disse modificeres med tillæg/fradrag fra skema XII, idet der ikke medregnes valeur for infanteri, som angriber. Resultatet aflæses af skema XIII.

"Tactical unity and moral are factors of far more importance in battle than mere numerical strength. Troops that have been hotly engaged, even with success, and whose nerves are wrought up to a high state of tension, are peculiarly susceptible to surprise. If they have lost their order, and the men find themselves under strange officers, with unfamiliar faces besides them, the counterstroke falls with even greater force. It is at such moments that cavalry finds its opportunities. It is at such moments that a resolute charge, pushed home with drums beating and a loud cheer, may have extraordinary results." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 256).

07.03.3 Overfløjning kræver, at mindst to kompagnier har frontretning mod modstanderens udækkede flanke, og at angrebsvinklen er 20 grader eller derover.

07.03.4 Flankeangreb kræver, at mindst halvdelen af egen enhed er bag modstanderens forlængede frontlinie, og at angrebsvinklen er 45 grader eller derover. Der kan ikke samtidig gives tillæg for overfløjning.

"No attempt whatever was made to turn the Confederate flanks, although the Stone Bridge, except for the abattis, was now open, and Johnston's line might easily have been taken in reverse. Nor does it

appear that the cavalry was employed to ascertain where the flanks rested." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 148 on First Bull Run, 1861).

07.03.5 En støtteenhed består af mindst to kompagnier i sluttet formation (jf. 02.04.1), der skal være fra samme brigade som den støttede enhed. Den skal være inden for 20 cm af den støttede enhed og have denne inden for 30 grader af sin front.

#### **07.04.0 Nærkamp**

07.04.1 Såfremt to enheder er i brikkontakt ved et træks begyndelse, udkæmpes der nærkamp. Figurer, der deltager i en nærkamp, kan ikke beskydes af enheder, der ikke deltager i nærkampen.

07.04.2 Antallet af nærkampsenheder beregnes ved at dividere figurantallet med nedennævnte tal. Bliver der hermed en rest på mindst det i parenteser nævnte antal figurer, forhøjes antallet af nærkampsenheder med en.

07.04.3	Opsiddet kavaleri .....	3 (2)
	Afsiddet kavaleri .....	7 (4)
	Øvrige .....	6 (3)

07.04.4 Der medregnes figurer i brikkontakt med modstanderen og figurer i brikkontakt med disse figurer (dvs. de to forreste geledder med en overlappende figur på hver flanke).

07.04.5 En enhed, som angribes i flanken, kan efter chokkastet vende 2 kompagnier uden beregning af tid for at deltage i nærkampen. En enhed, der angribes i ryggen, kan tilsvarende foretage en halv-vending med hele enheden.

#### **07.05.0 Beregning af tab ved nærkamp**

07.05.1 Der kastes med to terninger. Summen af disse modificeres med de tillæg/fradrag fra skema V, som er angivet under linien for nærkamp, idet andre våben sidestilles med skydevåben (jf. 09.01.2). Resultatet aflæses i skema VI, der viser tab i mand pr. nærkampsenhed.

"While the Southern troopers generally carried a firearm, either a rifle or shot-gun, some of the Northern squadrons had only the sabre, and in a wooded country the firearm was master of the situation. During the first two years of the war, therefore, the Federal cavalry, generally speaking, were bad riders and worse horsemasters, unable to move except upon roads, and as inefficient on reconnaissance as in action. .... Bold scouting was impossible with such mounted troops as Banks possessed, and throughout the Valley campaign the Northern general was simply groping in the dark." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 226 on Kernstown, 1862).

07.05.2 Det samlede tab for modstanderens enhed noteres på dennes ordresedel. Har enheden hermed mistet 20 mand (inkl. tidligere tab), fjernes en figur.

07.05.3 Såfremt der fjernes en eller flere figurer, skal enheden straks teste moral (jf. 08.02.7).

07.05.4 Såfremt en general befinder sig i brikkontakt med en enhed, der lider tab som følge af nærkamp, falder generalen, såfremt resultatet af selve terningkastet er 7.

### 07.06.0 Fanger

07.06.1 Hvis angriberen ved chokkast slår modstanderen i FU, eller hvis den ene part i nærkamp kommer i FU, må enheden afgive fanger.

"The artillery on the crest was silenced by three batteries and Meade pushed on, supported on right by Gibbon, and, after severe fighting, carried the crest, capturing flags and prisoners. In the dense woods on the height, the connection with Gibbon was lost, and Meade, after a stubborn contest, was finally driven back, Gibbon holding his ground. Two regiments from the Third Corps arriving were sent to Gibbon's left, but were soon overpowered, and they were forced back with Gibbon." (Smith, William Ferrar: Franklin's "Left Grand Division", in Battles & Leaders, vol. 3, p. 135).

07.06.2 Fanger beregnes på grundlag af terningkastet, der medførte FU, uden tillæg/fradrag. Antal fanger i figurer pr. nærkampsenhed fremgår af skema XIV. Såfremt resultatet af selve terningkastet er 10, bliver en general i brikkontakt med enheden taget til fange.

07.06.3 En general eller ordonnans, der ikke er i brikkontakt med en enhed, og som har brugt sin bevægelse i trækket (jf. 03.01.5), bliver taget til fange, såfremt en af modstanderens enheder kommer på indbrudsafstand.

07.06.4 Fanger fjernes fra bordet.



## 08.00.0 MORAL

### 08.01.0 Valeur

- 08.01.1 Hver enhed tildeles før spillets begyndelse en valeur. Denne ændres ikke under spillet. Valeuren kan være +2, +1, 0 eller -1.
- 08.01.2 Valeur tildeles især under hensyntagen til uddannelse og erfaring, men også udholdenhed overfor belastninger indgår.
- 08.01.3 +2 gives især til de regulære enheder, men også til eliteenheder som Iron Brigade og Stonewall Brigade.
- 08.01.4 +1 gives til veteraner og andre veluddannede enheder.
- 08.01.5 0 gives til enheder med nogen kamperfaring.
- 08.01.6 -1 gives til nyoprettede enheder, men også til enheder med dårlig moral.

"Garnett soon learned something of the men entrusted to him. City-dwellers he had, who never had seen mountains, and with them he had mountaineers who never had seen cities. Two things only did these soldiers possess in common vast zeal and military inexperience. To them Garnett gave such slight instruction as time permitted." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants a Study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1942, Vol 1, p. 28).

### 08.02.0 Orden

- 08.02.1 En enhed kan være i orden (OR), let uorden (LU), uorden (U) eller fuldstændig uorden (FU). En enhed i LU kan samtidig være nedholdt (NH).
- 08.02.2 Alle enheder starter spillet i OR. Enhederne er disciplinerede og adlyder ordrer.
- 08.02.3 LU repræsenterer en enhed, hvor formationen ikke er helt ordnet, hvilket vanskeliggør kommandoføring, og soldaterne er lidt usikre, fordi officererne ikke har fuld kontrol.
- 08.02.4 NH repræsenterer en enhed, der som følge af beskydning på nært hold er kommet i LU og er faldet ned, og som kommer i U, hvis den trækkes tilbage.
- 08.02.5 U repræsenterer en enhed, hvor soldaterne er rystede, men endnu holder sammen. De retirerer væk fra modstanderen uden straks at vende sig, idet officererne kun har meget begrænset kontrol.
- 08.02.6 FU er den paniske flugt, hvor hver mand søger at redde sig selv uden tanke for sidemanden. Al kampvilje er midlertidigt forsvundet, og enhedens officerer har ingen indflydelse på enheden. Afprodsede pjecer efterlades, og artilleristerne flygter som infanteri.
- 08.02.7 En enhed, der skal fjerne en eller flere figurer, skal straks teste moral, for at se om dens orden påvirkes. Dette gøres ved at

summere tillæg/fradrag i skema XV, hvorefter der kastes med to terninger og et yderligere tillæg/fradrag medregnes fra skema XVI. Herefter aflæses resultatet i skema XVII.

"A defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent detachments. Those generals who have but little experience attempt to protect every point, while those who are better acquainted with their profession, having only the capital object in view, guard against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in smaller misfortunes to avoid greater (Frederick the Great's Instructions to his Generals). ..... To apply Frederick the Great's maxim requires greater strength of will in the statesman than in the soldier." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 174).

08.02.8 En enheds orden kan endvidere påvirkes ved bevægelser (jf. 02.05.6, 04.02.9, 04.02.10 og 07.01.6), ved chokkast (jf. 07.03.0) eller ved medriven (jf. 08.03.0).

08.02.9 Generaler og ordonnanser kan ikke komme i nogen form for uorden, uanset om de er i brikkontakt med en enhed, hvis orden påvirkes.

### **08.03.0 Medriven af egne enheder**

08.03.1 Hvis en enhed i FU kommer inden for 8 cm af en anden egen enhed, er der risiko for, at denne bliver revet med af den flygtende enhed. Dette gælder dog kun enheder, som befinder sig ved siden af eller bag den flygtende enhed.

"The extreme left of Archer's brigade, and the extreme right of Thomas's brigade, that is, the 14th Tennessee and 19th Georgia, commanded by Colonel Forbes, and a part of the 7th Tennessee, commanded by Colonel Goodner, of the former brigade, believing they were about to be surrounded, gave way. Their comrades on the right, unaware of the condition of affairs on the left, and seeing the enemy routed in their front, were amazed at this confusion. Officers and men on the right were enraged at what seemed to be cowardice, and, rushing toward the broken lines, officers levelled their pistols and, with many privates, fired into these fleeing comrades." (Moore, J.H.: With Jackson at Hamilton's Crossing, in Battles & Leaders, vol. 3, p. 140).

"There can be little question that the spirit of infantry depends greatly on the staunchness of artillery. A single battery, pushed boldly forward into the front of battle, has often restored the vigour of a wavering line. Although the losses it inflicts may not be large, the moral effect of its support is undeniable. So long as the guns hold fast victory seems impossible. But when these useful auxiliaries are driven back or captured a general depression becomes inevitable. The retreat of the artillery strikes a chill into the fighting line which is ominous of defeat, and it is a wise regulation that compels batteries, even when their ammunition is exhausted, to stand ground. The Federal infantry at Bull Run had seen their artillery overwhelmed, the teams destroyed, the gunners shot down, and the enemy's riflemen swarming amongst the abandoned pieces. But so vigorous had been their efforts to restore the battle, that the front of defence had been with difficulty maintained." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 159 on First Bull Run, 1861).

"A heavy volley, suddenly delivered, drove the Confederate cavalry back in confusion on the infantry supports. The 33rd Virginia was completely broken by the rush of flying horsemen; the guns were overridden; and Jackson and his staff were left alone upon the turnpike." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 335, on Winchester, 1862).

08.03.2 Der kastes med to terninger. Tillæg og fradrag samt resultater fremgår af skema XVIII.

08.03.3 Hvis den truede enhed er mindst 3 gange så stor som den flygtende, kan den dog ikke medrives.

08.03.4 Hvis en truet enhed, som befinder sig bag den flygtende enhed, ikke medrives, bremses flugten i dette træk bag den truede enhed.

#### **08.04.0 Reorganisering**

08.04.1 En enhed, der er kommet i LU, kan reorganiseres til OR i løbet af 2 på hinanden følgende træk, hvis enheden ikke lider tab. I slutningen af det andet træk kommer enheden i OR.

08.04.2 En enhed, der er kommet i U, kan reorganiseres til LU ved at stå stille i 2 på hinanden følgende træk uden at lide tab, blive angrebet eller udføre nogen form for aktivitet. I slutningen af det andet træk kommer enheden i LU.

08.04.3 En enhed, der er kommet i FU, kan forsøge at reorganisere til U i slutningen af samme træk og de to efterfølgende træk. Der gives således i alt 3 forsøg. Tillæg og fradrag samt resultater fremgår af skema XIX. Mislykkes alle 3 forsøg, flygter enheden hurtigst muligt ud over egen brætkant og er tabt for resten af spillet.

08.04.4 Figurer i FU inden for indbrudsafstand af en modstander ved trækkets slutning kan ikke reorganiseres og må overgive sig.

#### **08.05.0 Udnævnelse af nye generaler**

08.05.1 Såfremt en general falder (jf. 05.02.7, 06.03.9 og 07.05.4) eller bliver taget til fange (jf. 07.06.2 og 07.06.3), overtager den direkte overordnede general kommandoen og forsøger at udnævne en efterfølger for den faldne eller tilfangetagne general.

08.05.2 Såfremt det er den øverstkommanderende, der falder eller bliver taget til fange, overtager en direkte underordnet general kommandoen og forsøger at udnævne en efterfølger for sig selv.

08.05.3 Forsøg på udnævnelse foretages i slutningen af det træk, hvor generalen falder eller bliver taget til fange. Forsøget kan gentages i slutningen af hvert efterfølgende træk, indtil udnævnelsen er foretaget.

08.05.4 Der kastes med 2 terninger. Såfremt der opnås mindst resultat 9, udnævnes den nye general, som placeres i brikkontakt med den udnævrende general (jf. skema XX).

## 09.00.0 AMMUNITION

### 09.01.0 Infanteri og kavaleri

09.01.1 Infanteri og kavaleri har ammunition, indtil de slår 2 enere, toere, treere eller firere ved skydning med håndvåben, inklusive nærkamp (jf. skema XXI). Undtaget herfra er enhedens første skydning i spillet.

"Soon after 11 A.M. the enemy approached the left of my line by the Telegraph road, and, deploying to my right, came forward and planted guidons or standards (whether to mark their advance or to aid in the alignment I do not know), and commenced firing; but the fire from our artillery, and especially the infantry fire from Cobb's brigade, so thinned their ranks that the line retreated without advancing, leaving their guidons planted. Soon another force, heavier than the first, advanced, and were driven back with great slaughter. They were met on retiring by reinforcements, and advanced again, but were again repulsed, with great loss. This continued until about 1 P.M., when General Cobb reported to me that he was short of ammunition. I sent his own very intelligent and brave courier, little Johnny Clark, from Augusta, Georgia, to bring up his ordnance supplies, and directed General Kershaw to reinforce General Cobb with two of his South Carolina regiments, and I also sent the 16th Georgia, which had been detached, to report to General Cobb." (McLaws, Lafayette: The Confederate Left at Fredericksburg, in Battles & Leaders, vol. 3, p. 92).

"His [Johnston] ammunition was scanty in the extreme; the infantry had but fourteen cartridges apiece; and although his patience was construed by his troops as a want of enterprise, he had in truth displayed great daring in offering battle south of Martinsburg." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 130).

"The Confederate infantry had everywhere to do with superior numbers, and the artillery, in that wooded ground, could lend but small support. .... But the end could not be long delayed. Ammunition was giving out." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 242 on Kernstown, 1862).

"On June 4, the day that the enemy reached Luray, Ewell was ordered to provide his men with two day's cooked rations and to complete their ammunition for 'active service'. The next day, however, it was found that Shields had halted." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 365, on Cross Keys, 1862).

09.01.2 Enheder, der er løbet tør for ammunition, kan fortsat deltage i nærkamp.

### 09.02.0 Artilleri

09.02.1 Glatløbede kanoner har 4 granater, 6 fuldkugler og 2 kardæsker. Rifledede kanoner har 6 granater, 4 fuldkugler og 2 kardæsker. Haubitsere har 10 granater og 2 kardæsker. Withworth har 10 fuldkugler og 2 kardæsker. Morterer har 12 granater.

"We were compelled to call upon the infantry to help us at the guns. Eshleman crossed over from the right to report his guns nearly out of ammunition; the other officers reported the same. They were limited to a few solid shot only." (Owen, William Miller: A hot day on Marye's Heights, in Battles & Leaders, vol. 3, p. 99).

"After withdrawing from the hill the command was placed in bivouac, and the men threw themselves upon the ground to take a much-needed rest. We had been under the hottest fire men ever experienced for four hours and a half, and our loss had been three killed and twenty-four wounded. Among them was Sergeant John Wood, our leading spirit in camp theatricals, who was severely injured and never returned to duty. One gun was slightly disabled, and we had exhausted all of our canister, shell and



case shot, and nearly every solid shot in our chests. At 5:30 another attack was made by the enemy, but it was easily repulsed, and the battle of Fredericksburg was over, and Burnside was baffled and defeated." (Owen, William Miller: A hot day on Marye's Heights, in Battles & Leaders, vol. 3, p. 99).

"Among other missiles a 3-inch rifle-ball came crashing through the works and fell at our feet. Kursheedt picked it up and said, "Boys, let's send this back to them again"; and into the gun it went, and was sped back into the dense ranks of the enemy." (Owen, William Miller: A hot day on Marye's Heights, in Battles & Leaders, vol. 3, p. 98).

"Banks at last resolved to cross the Rubicon. 'Deficiency, he replied, in ammunition for Shields' artillery detains us here; expect it hourly, when we shall push Jackson sharply.' It was not, however, till April 2, four days later, that Mr. Lincoln's protégé crossed Tom's Brook." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 265 after Kernstown).

09.02.2 Kanonhaubits regnes som en glatløbet kanon.

### 09.03.0 Genforsyning

09.03.1 Genforsyning foretages fra en ammunitionsvogn, som enheden er i brikkontakt med. Genforsyning tager 1 træk, og der kan genforsynes to enheder pr. ammunitionsvogn. Der slås en terning, og ved resultat 1 for infanteri og kavaleri, eller 1 og 2 for artilleri, har genforsyning ikke fundet sted i dette træk. Der slås i slutningen af trækket.

"General Kershaw, with the remainder of his brigade, was ordered down to the stone-wall, rather, however, to carry ammunition than as a reinforcement for Cobb." (Longstreet, James: The Battle of Fredericksburg, in Battles & Leaders, vol. 3, p. 81).

"Fearing that Cobb's brigade might exhaust its ammunition, General Longstreet had directed General Kershaw to take two regiments to its support." (Ransom, Robert: Ransom's division at Fredericksburg, in Battles & Leaders, vol. 3, p. 94).

"The sudden appearance of the enemy caused the greatest consternation amongst the teamsters; several of the waggons went off by the Staunton road: and, had the Federal cavalry come on, the whole would have been stampeded. But Carrington's battery was called to the front by Captain Moore, commanding the company of infantry in the village. The picket, promptly put into position, opened with a well-aimed volley, and a few rounds checked the enemy's advance; the guns came rapidly and effectively into action, and at this critical moment Jackson intervened with his usual vigour." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 370, on Cross Keys, 1862).

09.03.2 Det understreges, at genforsyning er en handling, hvormed mulighed for bevægelse og skydning mv. bortfalder. Enheden kan dog skyde som overrasket, men så falder muligheden for genforsyning i dette træk bort. Der kan genforsynes under beskydning.

## 10.00.0 FELTARBEJDER

### 10.01.0 Generelt

10.01.1 Der arbejdes kun i hele træk, således at et træks arbejde bortfalder, såfremt det afbrydes i løbet af trækket. Såfremt en stilling forlades, inden et arbejde er fuldført, bortfalder arbejdet helt.

10.01.2 Feltarbejder, der ikke er omtalt nedenfor, aftales med dommeren.

"Next day, June 3, the skirmishing was continued; and the Confederates, burning the bridges across the roads, retreated to Mount Jackson. .... Jackson, meanwhile, constructing a ferry at Mount Crawford, had sent back his sick and wounded to Staunton, thus saving them the long detour by Port Republic." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 361, on Port Royal 1862).

"Shields, meanwhile, had concentrated his troops at Columbia Bridge on the 6th, and presuming that Jackson was standing fast on the strong position at Rude's hill, had begun building a bridge." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 364, on Cross Keys, 1862).

### 10.02.0 Feltbefæstning

10.02.1 Infanteri og afsiddet kavaleri kan lave en let feltbefæstning til enhedens bredde i linie i løbet af 6 træk.

"Against troops which can manoeuvre earthworks are useless, as the history of Sherman's operations in 1864 conclusively shows." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 170).

10.02.2 Egentlige feltbefæstninger skal angives i grundlaget.

### 10.03.0 Forhug

10.03.1 Forhug kan laves på samme måde som let feltbefæstning (jf. 10.02.0), men med følgende ændringer. Enheden skal være inden for 10 cm af en skov. Der bygges kun til det halve af enhedens bredde i linie, eller det tager dobbelt så lang tid, hvilket noteres på ordresedlen.

"He [Garnett] also improved rapidly his position on Laurel Hill and felled trees to close all the lesser roads and trails by which he could be flanked. The Buckhannon Pass naturally was a strong position, but he prudently constructed below the pass various rough fortifications with which, he predicted, a regiment "will be able to hold five times their number in check for a sufficient time to admit of being reinforced, if they will stand to their work." (Freeman, Douglas S.: Lee's Lieutenants a Study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1942, Vol 1, p. 28).

### 10.04.0 Barrikade

10.04.1 Barrikader kan kun bygges i byer. En barrikade kan bygges af 3 figurer i løbet af 4 træk. Den ryddes i løbet af 3 træk. Der bygges 3 cm.

### **10.05.0 Chevaux de frise**

10.05.1 Chevaux de frise kræver særligt materiel, som angives i grundlaget. Der bygges 3 cm af 6 figurer i løbet af 6 træk.

### **10.06.0 Rydning af hegn**

10.06.1 Hegn kan ryddes i løbet af 2 træk. Der ryddes 8 cm af 3 figurer.



## ANDRE KILDEHENVISNINGER

"It had been hoped, for the next engagements, that Henderson's glorious biography of Stonewall Jackson would supply a proper introduction to Ashby and Ewell and Trimble and Charles Winder. Instead, it was found that documents which had been disregarded by Henderson, or brought to light after the appearance of this book, made imperative a complete re-examination of the operations from Kernstown to Port Republic." (Freeman, Douglas Southall: Lee's Lieutenants a Study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1942, Vol 1, p. xvi).

"He [Lee] was hampered then and increasingly thereafter by the necessity of maintaining a rough balance of commissions among the Generals from the different states." (Freeman, Douglas Southall: Lee's Lieutenants a Study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1942, Vol 1, p. xxvi).

"From the outset he [Beauregard] shows a lack of the sense of logistics and he grossly overestimates the strategical combinations possible with green troops and inexperienced staff, but he has the good fortune to rout the enemy at Manassas, July 21, 1861." (Freeman, Douglas Southall: Lee's Lieutenants a Study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1942, Vol 1, p. xxxii).

"In the end, when his [Magruder] great opportunity comes, he shows a weakness not uncommon in war an excited, overzealous desire to do all his work in person." (Freeman, Douglas Southall: Lee's Lieutenants a Study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1942, Vol 1, p. xxxiv).

"He [Johnston] has, also, unmistakable strategical sense, though doubts, concerning his administrative capacity and his attention to detail gradually accumulate." (Freeman, Douglas Southall: Lee's Lieutenants a Study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1942, Vol 1, p. xxxviii).

"From the first scene he [Stonewall Jackson] grows in importance until he becomes the hero of the drama, and then, abruptly, he fails in a climactic hour and raises a question whether he can work in harness." (Freeman, Douglas Southall: Lee's Lieutenants a Study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1942, Vol 1, p. xlii).

"If he [Longstreet] is not brilliant, in strategy or in conversation, he is solid and systematic." (Freeman, Douglas Southall: Lee's Lieutenants a Study in Command, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1942, Vol 1, p. xlv).

"In the well-stocked library of the Institute he [Stonewall Jackson] found every opportunity of increasing his professional knowledge. He was an untiring reader. The wars of Napoleon were his constant study." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 58).

"He [Stonewall Jackson] had a library, which, though small, was select, composed chiefly of scientific, historical, and religious books, with some of a lighter character, and some in Spanish and French. Nearly all of them were full of his pencil marks, made with a view to future reference." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 69).

"In the great wars of the early part of the century Ney and Blucher were probably the best fighting generals of France and Prussia. But neither could be trusted to conduct a campaign." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 75).

"The cotton and tobacco of the South, monopolising the markets of the world, asked for free trade. The manufacturers of New England, struggling against foreign competition, were strong protectionists, and they were powerful enough to enforce their will in the shape of an oppressive tariff. Thus the planters of Virginia paid high prices in order that mills might flourish in Connecticut; and the sovereign States of the South, to their own detriment, were compelled to contribute to the abundance of the wealthier North."

(Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 83).

"The constitution, they [the South] held, was nothing more than a treaty which they had entered into for their own convenience, and which, in the exercise of their sovereign powers, individually or collectively, they might abrogate when they pleased ..... For an admirable statement of the Southern doctrine, see Ropes' History of the Civil War, vol. i, chap. i." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 92).

"When in process of time, the history of Secession comes to be viewed with the same freedom from prejudice as the history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it will be clear that the fourth great Revolution of the English-speaking race differs in no essential characteristic from those which precede it. It was not simply because the five members were illegally impeached in 1642, the seven bishops illegally tried in 1688, men shot at Lexington in 1775, or slavery threatened in 1861, that the people rose. In each case a great principle was at stake: in 1642 the liberty of the subject; in 1688 the integrity of the Protestant faith; in 1775 taxation only with the consent of the taxed; in 1861 the sovereignty of the individual States. (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 94).

"When the Constitution of the United States was ratified, Virginia, by the mouth of its legislature, had solemnly declared 'that the powers granted [to the Federal Government] under the Constitution, being truly derived from the people of the United States, may be resumed by them whenever the same shall be perverted to their injury and oppression.' And this declaration had been more than once affirmed." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 96).

"A march of eighty or one hundred miles into an enemy's country sounds a simple feat, but unless every detail has been most carefully thought out, it will not improbably be more disastrous than a lost battle. A march of two or three hundred miles is a great military operation; a march of six hundred an enterprise of which there are few examples." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 107).

"In 1861, the population of the United States, spread over a territory as large as Europe, was less than that of England, and a great part of that territory was practically unexplored." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 107).

"The city of Atlanta, which may be considered as the heart of the Confederacy, was sixty days' march from the Potomac, the same distance as Vienna from the English Channel, or Moscow from the Niemen. New Orleans, the commercial metropolis, was thirty-six days' march from Ohio, the same distance as Berlin from the Moselle. Thus space was all in favour of the South; even should the enemy overrun her borders, her principal cities, few in number, were far removed from the hostile bases, and the important railway junctions were perfectly secure from sudden attack. And space, especially when means of communication are scanty, is the greatest of obstacles." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 109).

"In the campaign of 1814, the distribution of the French troops at the most critical moment was made known to the allies by the capture of a courier carrying a letter from Napoleon to the Empress." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 116).

"Even in America itself, on two occasions, at Sharpsburg in 1862, and at Gettysburg in 1863, it was admitted by the North that the Southerners were within a stone's throw of independence." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 169).

"The Confederate authorities were wise enough to permit their generals to choose for themselves the instruments on which they would have to rely for the execution of their designs. Wellington, in 1815, had

forced on him by the Horse Guards, in the teeth of his indignant remonstrances, incompetent officers whom he did not know and whom he could not trust." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 180).

"The mismanagement of the national resources in the war with France was condoned by the victories of Wellington. The vicious conceptions of the Government, responsible for so many useless enterprises, for waste of life, of treasure, of opportunity, were lost in the blaze of triumph in which the struggle ended. Forty years later it had been forgotten that the Cabinet of 1815 had done its best to loose the battle of Waterloo; the lessons of the great war were disregarded, and the Cabinet of 1853-54 was allowed to work its will on the army of the Crimea." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 208).

"It is a significant fact that, during the War of Secession, for the three years the control of the armies of the North remained in the hands of the Cabinet the balance of success lay with the Confederates. But in March 1864 Grant was appointed Commander-in-Chief; Lincoln abdicated his military functions in his favour, and the Secretary of War had nothing more to do than to comply with his requisitions. Then, for the first time, the enormous armies of the Union were manoeuvred in harmonious combination, and the superior force was exerted to its full effect. Nor is it less significant that during the most critical period of the 1862 Campaign, the most glorious to the Confederacy, Lee was Commander-in-Chief of the Southern armies. But when Lee left Richmond for the Northern border, Davis once more assumed control, retaining it until it was too late to stave off ruin." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 208).

"Intoxicating liquors were forbidden in the Confederate lines. But the regulation was systematically evaded, and the friends of the soldiers smuggled in supplies." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 214).

"Mr. Davis, knowing something of war, certainly showed more wisdom. The organisation of the Army of Northern Virginia was left, in great measure, to General Lee; so from the very first the Southerners had sufficient cavalry and as good a staff as could be got together. The soldiers, however, were only enlisted at first for twelve months. 'Lee, says Lord Wolseley, pleaded in favour of the engagement being for the duration of the war, but he pleaded in vain;' and it was not for many months that the politicians could be induced to cancel the regulation under which the men elected their officers. The President, too, while the markets of Europe were still open, neglected to lay in a store of munitions of war: it was not till May that an order was sent across the seas, and then only for 10,000 muskets! The commissariat department, moreover, was responsible to the President and not to the commander of the armies; this, perhaps, was the worst fault of all." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 215).

"The only standing order in the English army of the Peninsula which referred to dress forbade the wearing of the enemy's uniform. It was the same in the Army of the Valley [in 1862], although at a later period even this order was of necessity ignored. As their forefathers of the Revolution took post in Washington's ranks clad in hunting shirts and leggings, so the Confederate soldiers preferred the garments spun by their own women to those supplied to them by the State. Grey, of all shades, from light blue to butter-nut, was the universal colour." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 221).

"Overcoats were soon discarded. 'The men came to the conclusion that the trouble of carrying them on hot days outweighed their comfort when the cold day arrived. Besides, they found that life in the open air hardened them to such an extent that changes in temperature were hardly felt.' (Soldier Life in the Army of Northern Virginia, chap. ii). Nor did the knapsack long survive. 'It was found to gall the back and shoulders and weary the man before half the march was accomplished. It did not pay to carry around clean clothes while waiting for the time to use them.' (ibid). But the men still clung to their blankets and india-rubber sheets, and the indispensable haversack carried their whole kit." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 222).

"Tents, except the enemy's, were rarely seen. The Army of the Valley generally bivouacked in the

woods, the men sleeping in pairs, rolled in their blankets and rubber sheets." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 222).

"The cooking arrangements were primitive. A few frying-pans and skillets formed the culinary apparatus of a company, with a bucket or two in addition, and the frying pans were generally carried with their handles stuck in the rifle-barrels!" (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 222).

"In command of a few hundred riflemen and a section of horse-artillery he [Ashby in 1862] was unsurpassed; and if his men were apt to get out of hand in battle, his personal activity ensured their strict attention on the outposts." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 223).

"The regiments of Banks' army corps were recruited as a rule in the Western States; Ohio, Indiana, and West Virginia furnished the majority. They too were hunters and farmers, accustomed to firearms, and skilled in woodcraft. No hardier infantry marched beneath the Stars and Stripes; the artillery, armed with a proportion of rifled guns, was more efficient than that of the Confederates; and in cavalry alone were the federals overmatched." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 225 on Kernstown, 1862).

"The extraordinary taxation demanded by the war already pressed heavily on the people [of the North in 1862]. Stocks were falling rapidly, and the financial situation was almost critical. It is probable, too, that a blow at Washington would have done more than destroy all confidence in the Government. England and France were chafing under the effects of the blockade. The marts of Europe were hungry for cotton. There was much sympathy beyond seas with the seceded States; and, should Washington fall, the South, in all likelihood, would be recognised as an independent nation. Even if the Great Powers were to refuse her active aid in the shape of fleets and armies, she would at least have access to the money markets of the world; and it was possible that neither England nor France would endure the closing of her ports. The dread of foreign interference was, therefore, very real; and Lincoln, foreseeing the panic that would shake the nation should a Confederate army cross the Potomac at Harper's Ferry or Point of Rocks, was quite justified in insisting on the security of Washington being placed beyond a doubt." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 234).

"The truth is that in war, accurate intelligence, especially when two armies are in close contact, is exceedingly difficult to obtain. At Jena, even after the battle ended, Napoleon believed that the Prussians had put 80,000 men in line instead of 45,000. The night before Eylau, misled by the reports of Murat's cavalry, he was convinced that the Russians were retreating; and before Ligny he underestimated Blücher's strength by 40,000. The curious misconceptions under which the Germans commenced the battles of Spicheren, Mars-la-Tour, and Gravelotte will also occur to the military reader." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 259).

"Congress [Confederate], on April 16, passed a Conscription Act, under which all able-bodied whites, between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five, were compelled to serve. It was not found necessary, however, except in the case of three religious denominations, to enforce the Act in the Valley; and, in dealing with these sectarians, Jackson found a means of reconciling their scruples with their duty to their State. He organised them in companies as teamsters, pledging himself to employ them, so far as practicable, in other ways than fighting." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 273).

"While these events were in progress the remainder of the Confederate cavalry had also been busy. The 7th Virginia had moved to Buckton. The railway was torn up, the telegraph line cut, and an urgent message to Banks for reinforcements was intercepted." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 320 on Front Royal, 1862).

"Since the morning of the 19th [of May and until the 24th] the whole army had marched over eighty, and

Ewell's division ninety miles. And this average of seventeen miles a day had been maintained on rough and muddy roads, crossed by many unbridged streams, and over a high mountain. The day which had just passed had been especially severe. Ewell, who was in bivouac at Cedarville, five miles north of Front Royal on the Winchester turnpike, had marched more than twenty miles; and Jackson's own division, which had made four-and-twenty, was on foot from five in the morning till nine at night." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 327 on Front Royal, 1862).

"When the embarrassments under which the Federals laboured are laid bare, the passage of the Confederates between the converging armies loses something of its extraordinary character." (Henderson, G.F.R.: Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War. Longmans, Green and Co., London 1900, vol. 1, p. 354, after Winchester, 1862).





**SKEMAER****SKEMA I: MARCHLÆNGDER**

<u>Våbenart og formation</u>	<u>Vej</u>	<u>Alm. terræn</u>	<u>Vansk. terræn</u>	<u>Skov</u>	<u>Sump</u>	<u>Vandløb</u>
Infanteri:						
Marchkolonne	30	25	12	6	3	6
Angrebskolonne	-	25	12	6	-	-
Tynd linie	-	15	10	8	-	-
Linie	-	12	8	6	-	-
Kæde	-	25	15	10	5	6
Kolonne storm	35	30	15	8	-	-
Linie storm	-	20	10	-	-	-
Flugt	40	40	25	15	6	12
Formationsændring	-	30	15	8	5	-
Opsiddet kavaleri:						
Marchkolonne	50	40	25	6	-	6
Angrebskolonne	-	35	25	6	-	-
Linie	-	30	20	6	-	-
Kæde	-	40	25	8	-	6
Storm og flugt	70	55	25	8	-	8
Formationsændring	-	40	20	8	-	-
Stab	90	80	40	10	3	10
Artilleri:						
Kørende	40	25	12	4	-	6
Kørende flugt	40	40	20	-	-	8
Ridende	50	35	12	4	-	6
Ridende storm og flugt	60	50	20	-	-	8
Afprodset	-	4	2	2	-	-
Ammunitionsvogne	40	10	-	-	-	-


**SKEMA II: FORMATIONSÆNDRINGER OG VENDINGER**

<u>Våbenart og formation</u>	<u>1/4 vending</u>	<u>1/2 vending</u>	<u>Andet</u>
Infanteri og kavaleri	1/4 træk	1/4 træk	-
Afprodset artilleri	1/1 træk	1/2 træk	-
Påprodset artilleri	1/2 træk	1/1 træk	-
Kavaleri af- og opsidning	-	-	1/4 træk
Artilleri afprodsning	-	-	1/2 træk
Artilleri påprodsning	-	-	1/2 træk

Vendinger, der normalt tager 1 træk, tager 2 træk i vanskeligt terræn.

**SKEMA III: PASSAGE AF HINDRINGER**

- Hindring I: Passeres som almindeligt terræn.  
Dog som vanskeligt terræn af artilleri.
- Hindring II: Passeres som vanskeligt terræn.  
Kan ikke passeres af artilleri.
- Hindring III: Passeres med 6 cm i trækket.  
Kan ikke passeres af opsidet kavaleri eller artilleri.
- Hindring IV: Kan ikke passeres.



**SKEMA IV: SKUDZONER FOR HÅNDVÅBEN**

<u>Våben</u>	<u>Zone 1</u>	<u>Zone 2</u>	<u>Zone 3</u>	<u>Zone 4</u>	<u>Zone 5</u>
Glatløbet musket Tower M-12, M-22, M-42	0- 3	3- 5	5- 9	9-12	12-15
Riffel med kugle Mississippi M-41	0- 4	4- 8	8-14	14-20	20-30
Riffel med patron Harpers Ferry M-55, Enfield, Remington, Springfield M-61 til 64	0- 8	8-15	15-25	25-35	35-50
Skarpskytte Sharps	0-12	12-25	25-45	45-60	60-75
Finskytte Withworth	0-15	15-35	35-60	60-80	80-100
Riflet karabin Enfield, Burnside, Sharps, Spencer	0- 6	6-12	12-20	20-30	30-40
Haglgevær	0- 1	...	1- 5	...	5- 8
Pistol/revolver	0- 1	...	1- 4	...	4- 6

**SKEMA V: TILLÆG/FRADRAK VED HÅNDVÅBENSKYDNING OG NÆRKAMP**

<u>Forhold</u>	<u>Egne</u>	<u>Modstanderen</u>
Tynd linie	-	- 1
Kæde	-	- 2
Kolonne 5-n geledder	-	+ 3
Påprodset artilleri	-	+ 1
Afprodset artilleri	-	- 3
Opsiddet kavaleri	- 3	+ 3
Forældet musket (Tower M-12)	- 2	-
Flintelås (M-22)	- 1	-
Maynard percussion (Harpers Ferry M-55)	- 2	-
Baglade karabin/riffel på 0-25 cm (Burnside, Sharps)	+ 2	-
Repetet karabin/riffel på 0-25 cm (Spencer)	+ 4	-
Første skydning i spillet	+ 3	-
Ikke skudt i sidste træk	+ 1	-
Overrasket	- 4	-
-----NÆRKAMP-----		
Dækning I	+ 1	-
Dækning II-III	+ 2	-
LU	- 1	-
U	- 2	-
Haglgevær på zone 1	+ 3	-
Valeur	-1/+2	-

Ved nærkamp bruges kun de taktiske faktorer under stregen.

**SKEMA VI: TAB VED HÅNDVÅBENSKYDNING OG NÆRKAMP**

Tab i mand pr. skydeenhed:

Zone/resultat	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>15-n</u>
1	1	2	4	5	6	7	8	8	9	10	11	12	14	16	18
2	1	2	3	4	4	5	5	5	6	6	7	8	9	11	12
3	1	1	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	4	4	5	5	6
4	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	3	3	3	4	4
5	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	4

Mod enheder i dækning I: 1/2 tabsvirkning  
 Mod enheder i dækning II-III: 1/4 tabsvirkning  
 Mod nedholdte enheder: 1/2 tabsvirkning (kombineres med dækning)  
 General ved enheden: falder ved terningkast 10 (nærkamp: 7)

Skydeenheder

Opsiddet kavaleri i sluttet formation ..... 6 (3)  
 Opsiddet kavaleri i kæde ..... 4 (2)  
 Afsiddet kavaleri i sluttet formation eller tynd linie ..... 7 (4)  
 Afsiddet kavaleri i kæde ..... 5 (3)  
 Infanteri i sluttet formation eller tynd linie ..... 6 (3)  
 Infanteri i kæde ..... 4 (2)  
 Nedholdte enheder ..... dobbelt antal figurer

Nærkampsenheder

Opsiddet kavaleri ..... 3 (2)  
 Afsiddet kavaleri ..... 7 (4)  
 Øvrige ..... 6 (3)

**SKEMA VII: SKUDZONER FOR ARTILLERI**

<u>Pjece</u>	<u>Kardæsk</u>	<u>Granat</u>	<u>Fuldkugle</u>
6 pd kanon M-41 til M-42	15	80	110
6 pd riflet kanon Withworth	15	-	190
10 pd Parrot (3" Parrot)	20	100	140
10 pd Brooke (3" Brooke)	20	105	190
3" Rodman riflet (Ordnance 10 pd)	20	100	140
12 pd kanonhaubits M-41 til M-44	20	85	115
12 pd kanonhaubits M-57 (Napoleon)	20	85	115
12 pd riflet kanon Blakely	20	100	140
12 pd riflet kanon Armstrong	20	110	160
12 pd riflet kanon Withworth	20	-	250
20 pd Parrot	20	100	140
30 pd Parrot	20	115	155
12 pd haubits M-41 til M-44	15	75	-
24 pd haubits M-41 til M-44	20	90	-
32 pd haubits M-41 til M-44	20	110	-
3 pd bjerghaubits	12	60	-
12 pd bjerghaubits	14	65	-
10" morter	-	150	-

**SKEMA VIII: AFVIGELSE FOR FULDKUGLE OG GRANAT**

<u>Terningresultat</u>	<u>For kort</u>	<u>Venstre</u>	<u>Plet</u>	<u>Højre</u>	<u>For lang</u>
Glatløbet	2-3	4-5	6-8	9-10	11-12
Riflet	2	3-4	5-9	10-11	12
Withworth, Blakely, Armstrong	-	2-3	4-10	11-12	-

**SKEMA IX: TILLÆG/FRADRAG VED ARTILLERISKYDNING**

<u>Forhold</u>	<u>Egne</u>	<u>Modstanderen</u>
3 pd pjece	- 3	-
6 pd pjece	- 2	-
10 pd pjece (undtagen 3" Rodman)	- 1	-
20 pd pjece eller større	+ 1	-
Kardæsk	+ 4	-
Granat over 20 cm	+ 2	-
Fuldkugle 3-4 geledder	-	+ 2
Fuldkugle 5-n geledder	-	+ 4
Tynd linie	-	- 1
Kæde	-	- 2
Påprodset artilleri/ammunitionsvogn	-	- 2
Dækning I	-	- 1
Dækning II	-	- 2
Overrasket	- 4	-
LU	- 1	-
U	- 3	-
Valeur	-1/+2	-

**SKEMA X: TAB VED ARTILLERISKYDNING**

Tab i mand pr. batteri:

<u>Pjeceantal/ resultat</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>15-n</u>
6	2	4	6	8	10	14	18	24	36	48	60	72	96	120	144
5	2	3	5	7	8	12	15	20	30	40	50	60	80	100	120
4	1	3	4	5	7	9	12	16	24	32	40	48	64	80	96
3	1	2	3	4	5	7	9	12	18	24	30	36	48	60	72
2	1	1	2	3	3	4	6	8	12	16	20	24	32	40	48
1	0	0	1	1	2	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	16	20	24

Mod enheder i dækning III: 1/4 tabsvirkning  
 Mod afprodset artilleri: 1/2 tabsvirkning (kombineres med dækning)  
 Mod nedholdte enheder: 1/2 tabsvirkning (kombineres med dækning)  
 General ved enheden: falder ved terningkast 10

**SKEMA XI: MATERIELTAB VED KONTRABATTERISKYDNING**


Materieltab pr. batteri:

<u>Terningresultat</u>	<u>Virkning</u>
12	1 prods beskadiget og 4 heste dræbt
11	1 pjece beskadiget
10	1 prods ødelagt, og hvis påprodset: 1 pjece ødelagt
9	1 pjece ødelagt
8	1 prods beskadiget
7	1 pjece beskadiget
6	2 heste dræbt
5	1 hest dræbt
4 og mindre	intet tab

Ammunitionsvogne ødelægges ved resultat 7 og derover.

Fradrag til terningresultatet:

Dækning I:	- 1
Dækning II:	- 2
Dækning III:	- 3



**SKEMA XII: TILLÆG/FRADrag VED CHOKKAST**

<u>Forhold</u>	<u>Egne</u>	<u>Modstanderen</u>
100 % flere	+ 1	- 1
200 % flere	+ 2	- 2
Marchkolonne/tynd linie	- 2	+ 2
Kæde	- 3	+ 3
Overfløjning	+ 1	- 1
Angriber i ryggen	+ 2	-
Angriber i flanken eller arbejdende enhed	+ 4	-
Opsiddet sydstatskavaleri	+ 1	- 1
Opsiddet kavaleri mod holdende kavaleri	+ 3	-
Opsiddet kavaleri mod andre våbenarter	+ 1	-
Angreb uden ordre	- 2	+ 2
Angreb i storm	+ 1	- 1
Støtteenhed	+ 1	- 1
General ved enheden	+ 1	- 1
Hindring I	- 1	+ 1
Hindring II	- 2	+ 2
Hindring III	- 3	+ 3
Dækning III	-	- 1
LU	- 2	+ 2
U	-	+ 4
Valeur (ikke angribende infanteri)	-1/+2	-(-1/+2)

**SKEMA XIII: RESULTAT AF CHOKKAST**

<u>Terninger</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>15-n</u>
Orden	FU	U	U	LU	LU	OR	OR	LU	LU	LU	U	U	FU	FU	FU
Enhed	Egen .....						Modstanderens .....								

**SKEMA XIV: FANGER**

Fanger i figurer pr. nærkampsenhed (vindere)

<u>Våbenart/terninger</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>12</u>
Infanteri	-	1	1	1	1	2	2	2
Kavaleri/kavaleri	-	-	-	-	1	1	2	2
Kavaleri/andet	1	1	2	2	3	3	4	4
Artilleri pr. batteri	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1

General ved enheden: fanges ved terningkast 10

**SKEMA XV: TILLÆG/FRADrag VED MORALBEREGNING**

<u>Forhold</u>	<u>Tillæg/fradrag</u>
1 figur fjernet	- 1
2 figurer fjernet	- 4
3 figurer fjernet	- 7
4 figurer fjernet	- 10
5 eller flere figurer fjernet	- 15
Detacherede kompagnier (færre end 5 kmp)	- 1
Mistet 1/3 af oprindelig styrke	- 1
Mistet 2/3 af oprindelig styrke	- 3
Støtteenhed	+ 1
General ved enheden	+ 1
Dækning I	+ 1
Dækning II	+ 2
Dækning III	+ 4
Nedholdt	- 2
Andre våbenarter i nærkamp med opsiddet kavaleri	- 2
Flere tab end modstander i nærkamp	- 2
Beskydes i flanke eller ryg	- 3
Stationær og besvarer ikke håndvåbenild	- 1
LU	- 1
U	- 4
Valeur	-1/+2

**SKEMA XVI: TERNINGKAST VED MORALBEREGNING**

<u>Terningresultat</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>12</u>
Tillæg/fradrag	-3	-2	-2	-1	-1	0	+1	+1	+2	+2	+3

**SKEMA XVII: RESULTAT AF MORALBEREGNING**

<u>Resultat i alt</u>	<u>-n til -8</u>	<u>-7 til -4</u>	<u>-3 til -1</u>	<u>0 til n</u>
Orden	FU	U	LU	OR



**SKEMA XVIII: MEDRIVEN**

<u>Forhold</u>		<u>Tillæg/fradrag</u>	
Støtteenhed		+ 1	
General ved enheden		+ 2	
Dækning		+ 2	
LU		- 1	
U		- 2	
Valeur		-1/+2	
<u>Terninger</u>	<u>0-5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7-n</u>
Orden	FU	U	OR

**SKEMA XIX: REORGANISERING**

<u>Forhold for enheder i FU</u>		<u>Tillæg/fradrag</u>	
Flugt bremset i dette træk bag egen enhed, der ikke medrives i FU		+ 1	
General ved enheden		+ 2	
Valeur		-1/+2	
<u>Forsøg</u>	<u>1. træk</u>	<u>2. træk</u>	<u>3. træk</u>
Reorganisering fra FU til U	8-n	9-n	10-n
<u>Enheder i U og LU</u>	<u>Tid</u>		
Reorganisering fra U til LU	2 træk stationær og uden tab		
Reorganisering fra LU til OR	2 træk uden tab		

**SKEMA XX: UDNÆVNELSE AF NYE GENERALER**

<u>Handling</u>	<u>Vilkår</u>
Udnævnes ved	terningkast 9-n
Anbringes ved	den udnævrende general

**SKEMA XXI: AMMUNITION**

<u>Infanteri og kavaleri</u>	<u>Terningkast</u>		
Løber tør (ej første skydning)	2 enere, toere, treere eller firere		
<u>Artilleri</u>	<u>Granat</u>	<u>Fuldkugle</u>	<u>Kardæsk</u>
Glatløbet kanon	4	6	2
Riflet kanon	6	4	2
Haubits	10	-	2
Withworth	-	10	2
Morter	12	-	-
<u>Genforsyning bortfalder</u>	<u>Terningkast</u>		
Infanteri og kavaleri	1		
Artilleri	1-2		

En ammunitionsvogn kan genforsyne 2 enheder pr. træk

**SKEMA XXII: HINDRINGS OG DÆKNINGSVÆRDIER**

<u>Terrænform/genstand</u>	<u>Hindring</u>	<u>Dækning</u>
Barrikade	I-II	I
Bygning af træ	II	II
Bygning af sten	III	III
Let feltbefæstning	II	I
Egentlig feltbefæstning	III	III
Forhug	III	II
Chevaux de frise	III	-
Grøfter	I	-
Gærder og diger	I	I
Hegn og hække	I	-
Mure	I-III	I-II
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Skovkanter	I	I
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## STIKORDSREGISTER

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